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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 The Utah
Legislature has provided that the Utah Supreme Court may transfer "to the Court of
Appeals any case over which the Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,"2
which jurisdiction includes review of any order, judgment, decree over which the Court of
Appeals "does not have original jurisdiction."3 As the Court of Appeals does not have
original jurisdiction over this appeal filed by Citizen Mast,4 and the Utah Supreme Court
declined to take jurisdiction of the case, the Court of Appeals has proper jurisdiction of this
appeal.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court prematurely and actually err when it determined that the oral
and written statements by Commissioner Overson about Citizen Mast and
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, a Utah corporation, ("C.T.U.") were not defamatory
as a matter of law?
The standard of appellate review applied to summary judgment decisions views
"the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party," according no

1

Utah Const., Article VIII, §5.

2

U.C.A. § 78-2-3(4)

3

U.C.A. § 78-2-30)

4

U.C.A. § 78-2a-3
1

deference to the "conclusions of law" made by the trial court.5 "Whether a statement is
capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a question of law" which is reviewed for
"correctness."6
The standard that is used to review a trial court's granting or denial of a Rule 56(f)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("U.R.C.P.") motion is one of an abuse of discretion.7
The record below reflects Citizen Mast's legal claim that Commissioner Overson
made defamatory statements regarding him when Commissioner Overson held a press
conference on August 22, 1996. The defamatory claim raised by this appeal was
specifically raised in the Complaint,8 addressed by Commissioner Overson's motion for
summary judgment,9 and detailed in the oral argument by both counsel at the hearing on
summary judgment.10

5

Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Company, 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996) (citations
omitted.)
6

West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1006 (Utah 1994).

7

Strand v. Associated Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,193-194
(Utah 1977).
8

In the complaint, Citizen Mast alleged that "Defendant [Overson] accused
Plaintiff [Mast] of being a "liar" and of personally attacking Defendant and Salt Lake
County through an alleged "ruse" involving an organization known as the Concerned
Taxpayers of Utah." (Complaint, fl 5; Record at page 2 (hereafter "Rp "))
9

The legal existence of the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah is specifically
identified in the Uncontroverted Facts of Commissioner Overson, # 6, pg. vi. (Rp 220)
as well as the Affidavits submitted by Citizen Mast in support his Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P.
motion (Affidavit of Mast; Rp 264-271 and Affidavit of Simon; Rp 272-275).
10

Transcript of Hearing 27-28 (Rp 457-458); 31-32 (Rp 461-462), 40-41 (Rp 470471), 42-43 (Rp 472-473), 44 (Rp 474), 61 (Rp 491), 71-72 (Rp 501-502), 76-78 (Rp
506-508).
2

APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL
Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. states that "[s]hould it appear from affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify
his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may make a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to
be had or may such other order as is just."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Citizen Mast filed litigation against Commissioner Overson because Commissioner
Overson had made defamatory oral and written statements regarding Citizen Mast at a
press conference held in a public conference room at the County Building in Salt Lake
City. Commissioner Overson admitted that he announced to a public press conference
that "this 'Concerned Taxpayer of Utah' is a ruse. It is strictly a front for David Masf 11 and
had for those present a written statement that David Mast was using "the deceptive name
of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah"12 or "whatever [he] called [him]self.w13
Without filing an answer, and after Commissioner Overson received extensions of
time from Citizen Mast to do so, an extensive motion for summary judgment was filed in
lieu of an answer. During this time period, Citizen Mast had sought unsuccessfully at least
twice to take the deposition of Commissioner Overson. After oral argument, and taking

11

Incontroverted Facts of Commissioner Overson # 42, pg. xvi and footnote 1
(Rp 230); A 0230 and A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196-197).
12

A 0230 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196).

13

A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 197).
3

under advisement the Rule 56(f) U.R.CP. motion of Citizen Mast for leave to first take the
deposition of Commissioner Overson, the trial court granted summary judgment against
Citizen Mast on the grounds that the statements made in the newspapers were not
defamatory as a matter of law. Because of this ruling, the various privileged defenses
raised by Commissioner Overson or the Rule 56(f) U.R.CP. motion of Citizen Mast were
not considered by the trial court.
Because the trial court failed to (1) take into account all of the evidence before it
regarding the defamatory statements of Commissioner Overson, Citizen Mast and C.T.U.
and (2) grant the Rule 56(f) U.R.CP. motion of Citizen Mast, the trial court prematurely
granted Commissioner Oversows motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the
statements made were not defamatory as a matter of law.

Furthermore, even if the

Court's action was not premature, the Court erroneously granted the motion because the
statements that were made regarding Citizen Mast and his relationship to C.T.U. were, in
fact, defamatory as a matter of law and the record before the trial court showed that the
claimed privileges were not applicable.
A. The Trial Court Did Not Properly Review or Allow Discovery of All Relevant
Evidence Prior to Ruling on Commissioner Overson's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
The trial court's memorandum decision specifically identified the evidence that it
relied upon for evidence of defamatory statements.
The defendant's [Overson's] reactions to the
advertisement [of C.T.U.] were reported and quoted in two
separate local newspaper articles. Closely following these
articles, a full-page advertisement, paid for the defendant's reelection committee and co-signed by the defendant and
4

others, was published in a local newspaper. The statements
alleged to be defamatory to the plaintiff [Mast] are contained
within these three publications.14
The trial court failed to acknowledge in its analysis that it also had before it the written
statements of Commissioner Overson at the press conference which stated that David
Mast was using "the deceptive name of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah"15 or "whatever [he]
called [himjself."16 The phrase "deceptive" has been recognized in Utah judicial opinions
as a state of mind that would indicate an individual did not have honesty, integrity or
trustworthiness.17
In addition, the trial court failed to allow discovery to be made when a request under
Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. was specifically made to take the deposition of Commissioner Overson
to clarify and elucidate what was stated at the press conference. Citizen Mast sought to
take the deposition specifically because
[t]he full text of his statement is not now in my possession, and
can only be obtained by discovery. The version attached to
Defendant's Motion is not, in my recollection, accurate and

14

Memorandum Decision, Page 2 (Rp 407).

15

A 0230 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196).

16

A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 197).

17

Indicating one would come back with a warrant when one knew they would not
be able to come back with a warrant was "deceptive." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,
1207 (Utah 1995). "The state obviously has a substantial and compelling interest in
protecting the public from false, deceptive, or misleading advertising." In re Utah State
Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991, 993 (Utah 1982). "It is further significant that there is
nothing secretive or deceptive about this conveyance." Road Runner Inn v. Merrill, 605
P.2d 776, 777 (Utah 1980). "The offense of theft by deception is plainly intended to
protect unwary members of the public from a broad range of fraudulent or deceptive
schemes." State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681,
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted.)
5

complete. Without discovery I will not be able to refute the
version used by the Defendant. . . . I have not been able to
obtain, and will not be able to obtain without discovery, copies
of the way in which this news conference was reported on
radio and television.18
The failure to allow discovery requested pursuant to Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. had two
significant impacts:
First, the trial court failed to have before it an entire oral text of the press conference
where Citizen Mast claimed the defamatory statements were made by Commissioner
Overson. This can be shown in two ways: First, the trial court limited itself to a review of
what one Deseret News reporter stated regarding the case.19 Second, even if the entire
text was not available from Commissioner Overson or his public relations firm, alternate
versions of the conference on radio and television could have sought to elucidate the
nature of any additional comments and statements made by Commissioner Overson. A
factual question as to the nature and extent of those comments was created by Citizen
Mast when he stated under oath that a[t]he version attached to the Defendants motion is
not, in my recollection, accurate and complete."20

18

Affidavit of David K. Mast, Iffl 4, 7 (Rp 265).

19

Judicial notice may well be taken of the common experience that newspaper
accounts — while better than no account — either usually do not contain all statements
made in their entirety or only include those that are relevant to the issue or perspective
of the reporter. For example, the Salt Lake Tribune account of the same press
conference appeared to have drawn more from the written statement and failed to
address the accusations made by Commissioner Overson that Citizen Mast had used
C.T.U. in a deceptive way, as a ruse or front for his own benefit. Compare Affidavit of
Ellis A 0229 (Rp 198) and A 0330 (Rp 197).
20

Affidavit of David K. Mast, ffll 4 (Rp 265).
6

Second, there were significant factual questions that were present regarding the
nature of the defenses available to Defendant Overson. Questions of fact regarding the
nature of the capacity in which he was acting — official or private —, his awareness of the
difference between C.T.U. and Citizen Mast, and his motivation for making his declarations
regarding Citizen Mast were all recognized to exist by the trial court at the time of oral
argument. For example, as to the questions of fact relating to the capacity in which
Commissioner Overson was acting, Judge Thorne engaged in the following discussion with
counsel for Commissioner Overson:
THE COURT: I mean, if there was such an immunity,
the Supreme Court wouldn't have issued the decision they did
a couple of weeks ago.
MR. GURMANKIN: I'm not sure —
THE COURT: Paula Jones and the President.21
Specifically focusing on the facts of this case, Judge Thorne engaged in the following
discussion with counsel for Commissioner Overson:
THE COURT: So, Mr. Overson could get up at a press
conference and talk about somebody's personal life, make
things up and he has an absolute defense?
MR. GURMANKIN: If he went beyond his duties in
dealing with South-South Mountain, then perhaps not; but as
long as he was talking in the confines of what he had done
and what —
THE COURT: Well, let's say it's within the confines of
South Mountain, he could get up and say, Mr. Mast is a soand-so and does these things to kids and this to this and he
would have absolute immunity?
MR. GURMANKIN: The answer to that is, as long as it's
in the course of performing his executive duties, yes.
And that's similar to the speech and debate clause of
the — of the Constitution.
21

Transcript at 45, lines 4-9 (Rp 475).
7

THE COURT: But the — doesn't the fact question come
up when he crosses the line that line to — in terms of personal
versus official duties?22
Even when legal and factual arguments were crossed the trial court struggled with the
unresolved factual question of whether Commissioner Overson was acting in his personal
or official capacity at the press conference:
THE COURT: Well, I guess I still have a question even
looking at all those, was he defending himself as an individual
or was he defending the policies that he had supported as an
official, or a little bit of both at that conference?
MR. GURMANKIN: Well, I would say that he — if he
was doing both, it's still subject to that absolute immunity
because keeping the public's confidence in the integrity of a
public official as an individual is just as important.
THE COURT: Maybe I just grew up at the wrong time.
That sounds an awful lot like Watergate to me. I mean, where
you — you say the defense of the individual is really the
defense of the institution.23
Not only did Commissioner Overson's public and private conduct appear to create a
conflict of fact in the trial court, but the Commissioner's personal knowledge of the
separate nature of Citizen Mast and C.T.U. and the motivation of the Commissioner to
directly and indirectly imply false information regarding them was also identified by Judge
Thome as an area that would, at a minimum, require additional discovery.
THE COURT: But — but I would suggest that what Mr.
Snuffer indicated was that your client knew that Mast and
C.T.U. were not synonymous and his discovery would provide

Transcript at 47, line 18-48, line 13 (Rp 477 -478).
Transcript at 49, line 1 2 - 5 0 line 11 (Rp 479-480).

evidence of that and so that then becomes a factual
question.24
*

*

*

*

THE COURT: Yes, but I can see, Mr. Gurmankin, that
there are a number of things that you're putting forth that
would support your client's view that they were the same; but
whether they are or whether they are not, or whether your
client believed it or not becomes a factual question, doesn't it?
MR. GURMANKIN: No-no, your Honor, if — if he had
a good faith belief. A good faith belief-basis for believing itassuming it was defamatory and l-l can't believe that's—
THE COURT: But they haven't — they haven't asked
him that question yet, and aren't they entitled to say, Did you
have a good faith belief? Did you know about these other
things? Isn't that what the purpose of the deposition is, is to
see what those facts are?25
Thus, had the trial court, during oral argument, saw it was necessary to rule on the
defenses of privilege raised by Commissioner Overson, but it could not have done so
because of what it already recognized were the conflicting questions of fact that existed
in the record as to two dispositive issues that could vitiate all of the defenses. Those
issues were — in what capacity was Commissioner Overson acting and was Commissioner
Overson, based on the unrefuted evidence of his prior knowledge of the distinct difference
between C.T.U. and David K. Mast, malicious when he made defamatory reference to
Citizen Mast at the press conference.
The trial court's failure to consider evidence of defamatory language that was before
it and not allow discovery to proceed to secure the entire statement of Commissioner
Overson and its context, including the motivation for its declaration, constitutes reversible

24

Transcript at 54, line 24 - 55 line 3 (Rp 484-485).

25

Transcript at 55, line 22 - 56, line 12 (Rp 485-486).

error as a matter of law in two ways. First, the written statement of Commissioner
Overson at the press conference indicated that David Mast was using "the deceptive
name of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah"26 or "whatever [he] called [him]self."27 However,
since C.T.U. receives funds as a separate entity from Citizen Mast and has spoken out on
many political matters such as the Utah Transit Authority budget, the Utah bid for the 2002
Olympics and the proposed light rail system26 and other matters, even if Citizen Mast was
opposed to the same,29 to claim that Citizen Mast used C.T.U. as a "deceptive name" for
himself, personally, constitutes under Utah law at least an implicit statement that Citizen
Mast has engaged in criminal conduct.30 This is defamatory language in and of itself and
with or without the language quoted from the Deseret News constitutes a basis for
reversal.
Second, the trial court should have allowed discovery to occur so that the most
complete account of what happened at the press conference and what motivated

26

A 0230 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196).

27

A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 197). Of course, the Affidavits of Scott Simons,
Robert Christiansen, and Randall Doyle and the Uncontroverted Facts of
Commissioner Overson noted heretofore all refute the claim that Citizen Mast and
C.T.U. are as a matter of law the same entity.
26

Affidavit of Scott Simons fl 5 (Rp 273).

29

Affidavit of Randall Doyle fl 6 (Rp 384).

30

If C.T.U. was used by Citizen Mast as a deception, it could easily be
contended that as President he had unlawfully dealt with the property of the corporation
as a fiduciary, U.C.A. § 76-6-513, or that if the corporation was deemed not to exist
under "alter-ego" theories, the funds received by C.T.U. (now alias Citizen Mast) had
been obtained by deception in violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-405(1).

10

Commissioner Overson could be presented to the court. At the oral argument, Citizen
Mast suggested to the trial court that the precedent raised in the case of Strand v.
Associated Students of University of Utah™ precluded summary judgment and required
discovery to proceed.

Like that case, the nature of the defamatory language and the

applicability of the defenses raised in the summary judgment materials of Commissioner
Overson
concerned knowledge in the possession and control of
defendant; there had not been sufficient time since the
inception of the law suit for plaintiff to utilize discovery
procedures, and thereby have an opportunity to cross-examine
the moving party. The pleadings had not been closed, and
there were complex legal issues posed, with an inadequate
factual basis. Under such circumstances, it was an abuse of
discretion to grant defendant's motion. The court should have
ordered a continuance to permit discovery, or denied the
motion for summary judgment, without prejudice after its
renewal, after adequate time had elapsed in which the plaintiff
could have obtained the desired information.32
Whether the obvious questions of fact that existed in Commissioner Oversows own motion
or those raised in Citizen Mast's Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. are used, the facts that went to the
heart of the defenses of privilege raised by Commissioner Overson were not yet available.
Thus, under Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. precedent, the motion should have been postponed until
at least the full text of the oral statements made at the press conference and the motivation
for attacking Citizen Mast and C.T.U. were obtained.

31

Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,194 (Utah
1977). See Transcript page 15, line 18 - page 16, line 3 (Rp 445- 446).
32

Id

11

There was an error in the failure to consider evidence before the trial court of what
was communicated in writing at the press conference. There was an error in refusing to
allow discovery to occur so that a more complete account of what was said at the press
conference would be available for review. As a consequence of these errors, the trial court
prematurely and erroneously concluded that the statements made by Commissioner
Overson regarding the relationship of Citizen Mast and C.T.U. were not defamatory as
matter of law.
B. Even if the Trial Court Properly Limited Evidence of the Statements Made by
Commissioner Overson, Factual Questions Should Have Not Allowed Entry of
Summary Judgment.
Even without the written comments made by Commissioner Overson at the press
conference that were before the trial court, or those additional statements that would likely
be obtained through proper, orderly discovery, the statements that were in the record
regarding the relationship between Citizen Mast and C.T.U. created sufficient factual
questions about the statements being defamatory and applicable privileges so as to
prevent entry of summary judgment against Citizen Mast.
Commissioner Overson admitted for purposes of the summary judgment motion that
the statements reported in the Deseret News were accurate.

He stated that "this

'Concerned Taxpayer of Utah* is a ruse. It is strictly a front for David Mast."

w

This

statement was made even though at the time C.T.U. was in fact a corporation in good

33

Uncontroverted Facts of Commissioner Overson # 42, pg. xvi and footnote 1
(Rp 230); A 0230 and A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196-197).
12

standing,34 had taken positions contrary to those espoused by David Mast,35 had been
actively involved in significant political debates in the area dealing with the Utah Transit
Authority budget, the Utah bid for the 2002 Olympics and the proposed light rail system,36
and had even publicly sided with Commissioner Overson regarding the issue of allowing
non-union bids on the construction for the expansion of the Salt Palace in Salt Lake City,
Utah.37 By claiming that C.T.U. was "a ruse,38" and "strictly a front for David Mast,"39
Commissioner Overson created a direct and indirect factual impression40 that would allow
a reasonable citizen to conclude that Citizen Mast was engaging in criminal conduct41 or

34

A 0008 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 47); Affidavit of Scott Simons, fl 2 (Rp 272).

35

Affidavit of Randall Doyle, 1f 6 (Rp 384).

36

Affidavit of Scott Simons If 5 (Rp 273).

37

Id.

38

While a dictionary definition is not admittedly not definitive, the term "ruse" has
been used to mean a failed plan of perjury, State v. Dodge, 425 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah
1967) or trying to sell a home one does not own. State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277,
279 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Enticing one under penal statutes meant drawing another
into a situation "by ruse or wiles." State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).
39

Uncontroverted Facts of Commissioner Overson # 42, pg. xvi and footnote 1
(Rp 230); A 0230 and A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196-197).
40

Statements that were defamatory on their face or defamatory by implication
are actionable under Utah law. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1011
(Utah 1994).
41

If C.T.U. was used by Citizen Mast as a deception, it could easily be
contended that as President he had unlawfully dealt with the property of the corporation
as a fiduciary, U.C.A. § 76-6-513, or that if the corporation was deemed not to exist
under "alter-ego" theories, the funds received by C.T.U. (now alias Citizen Mast) had
been obtained by deception in violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-405(1).

13

that Citizen Mast was the same as C.T.U.42 Either situation served to impeach Citizen
Mast's "honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation and thereby exposefd] the individual to
public hatred, contempt or ridicule."43
If the court determines that the statements is capable of
sustaining such a meaning as a matter of law, the trier of fact
must then determine whether the statements was in fact so
understood by its audience.44
Citizen Mast submitted unrefuted evidence to the trial court that at a minimum after the
defamatory press conference, newspapers began to report that C.T.U. was Mast's
personal organization.45 Under these facts, the evidence before the trial court indicated
that the statements of Commissioner Overson regarding Citizen Mast were defamatory.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Evidence Before the Court Adequately Challenged the Applicability of the
Privileged Defenses Raised by Commissioner Overson.
Commissioner Overson raised a number of "privileged" defenses in his motion for
summary judgment that were not ruled upon by the trial court. In addition, a review of the
record before the court indicates that as a matter of law these defenses do not apply to the
defamatory language cited by Citizen Mast on appeal.46

42

Affidavit of David K. Mast, U 6 (Rp 265).

43

West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994).

44

Id.

45

Affidavit of David K. Mast, fl 6 (Rp 265).

46

These defenses were not responded to by Citizen Mast because of his
pending Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. motion that requested discovery be allowed to explore the
factual basis for the allegations made by Commissioner Overson as to these defenses.
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ARGUMENT OF APPELLANT
Background
As noted by the trial court during oral argument, there existed questions of fact as
to when Commissioner Overson was performing his duties when the defamatory material
was published. As it related to the relationship between Citizen Mast and C.T.U., the only
publication occurred when Commissioner Overson was holding a press conference at a
public conference room of the County Building with the public relations firm hired to aid
him with his successful re-election bid. The relationship of Citizen Mast and C.T.U. was
not a matter of public interest, county concern, initiated by any member of the press, or
involved in the official executive or legislative duties of Commissioner Overson. Holding
a press conference and a responding full-page ad paid for by one's re-election committee
creates at least a question of fact as to whether the expression occurred in response to
one's official duties rather than personal re-election efforts.
Second, the defense of "consent" does not apply in this case because Citizen Mast
never claimed or placed at issue the relationship of himself with C.T.U. This information
was not contained in either the opening newspaper add of C.T.U., any earlier letters, nor
Nonetheless, as the arguments and evidence presented by Commissioner Overson on
their face are sufficient to raise factual issues regarding the applicability of these
defenses to the defamatory comments raised in the lower court and on this appeal, they
may be appropriately reviewed at this time. Thus, not only was sufficient evidence in
the record, the specific arguments raised in the record, but the failure of the trial court
to consider them or recognize their inherent factual conflict constituted "plain error,"
which was both obvious to the trial court (as noted by the earlier exchanges between
the court and Commissioner Oversows counsel) and was harmful to Citizen Mast.
Thus, if required to do justice to Citizen Mast, the inherent errors associated with
applying these defenses to this case may be reviewed on appeal.
See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 58 (Utah 1993).
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the reply advertisement of Commissioner Overson. There was no consent to gratuitous
attacks regarding a significant legal issue that had not been raised previously and of which
there was evidence in the record to infer that Commissioner Overson had actual
knowledge was false.
Third, the accepted as valid Deseret News report of the press conference and the
written comments prepared at the same do not contain any indication that the statements
being made are expressions of opinion. Furthermore, Commissioner Overson admitted
that protections afforded under Article I § 15 of the Utah Constitution do not apply when
opinions state or imply facts that are false and defamatory.47 For reasons already in the
record, the statements explicitly and implicitly state facts that are false and defamatory.
Fourth, the qualified privilege of self-defense does not apply in this case because
it was C.T.U. that published the article to which Commissioner Overson responded and
Commissioner Oversows response was given to television and radio media rather than
solely the newspaper media. Furthermore, contrary to Commissioner Oversows assertion
to the trial court that calling the relationship of C.T.U. and Citizen Mast a "ruse" was
appropriate because Citizen Mast had not disclosed to the public that he was a "real estate
developer with a personal pecuniary interest in the dispute,"48 there is nothing in the record
to Commissioner Oversows claim that C.T.U. was a "front" for Citizen Mast or part of a
"ruse". Thus, the privilege of self-defense was neither limited in scope of issues nor in

47

West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1015 (Utah 1994).

48

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at
page 10(Rp240).
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audience. It is apparent that a question of fact as to malice was also created by the
Affidavits submitted in support of the Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. motion that indicated that
Commissioner Overson had previous experiences indicating these statements were false.
Fifth, Commissioner Overson's incantation of a privilege to protect one's personal
interest (which obviously is contradictory to any executive privilege) does not create a
qualified privilege to attack directly and indirectly Citizen Mast by claiming that a valid,
political action corporation is in fact his "front" or was part of a "ruse" to deceive the people
of Salt Lake County. For reasons noted earlier, it would also appear that the privilege was
excessively published and done with malice.
Sixth, the legal relationship of Citizen Mast and C.T.U. is not a matter of public
interest when both are operating in accordance with the laws of Utah. Commissioner
Overson did not need to address that at all to inform citizenry on matters of either public
concern or relative to his re-election campaign. Questions of fact are raised sufficient to
prevent a ruling that there was no excessive publication and there was no malice.
Seventh, even if Citizen Mast was a public figure as to matters relative to the
development of a golf course on South Mountain, he was not a public figure as to his
relationship with C.T.U. The affidavits submitted with the Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. motion
showed by undisputed evidence that C.T.U. and Citizen Mast were in fact separate as a
matter of law. Thus, the defamatory statements before the trial court were in error as a
matter of law. Furthermore, they also showed that the actions of C.T.U. had been of a
long-standing nature and were, in fact, known and in at least one situation, encouraged
by Commissioner Overson. Under these facts, there is at least a disputed question of fact
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whether or not there was actual malice, which would defeat the application of a summary
judgment in this situation.
Eighth, Commissioner Oversows record is not complete enough to demonstrate that
as a matter of law Commissioner Overson is protected by the Governmental Immunity Act.
This can be shown in two ways. First, for reasons outlined as to why he is not entitled to
Executive Immunity, there is a serious question of fact as to whether or not his defamatory
statements regarding C.T.U. and Citizen Mast were made "during the performance of the
employee's duties within the scope of employment, or under the color of authority."49
Second, the Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. affidavits that establish the long-standing separate
relationship between C.T.U. and Citizen Mast and Commissioner Oversows knowledge of
the same, create a factual basis for an inference that the conduct of Commissioner
Overson was conduct that was malicious. If so, by his own motion for summary judgment,
the conduct of Commissioner Overson is exempt from the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.
CONCLUSION
The trial court prematurely determined to grant the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment because it failed to consider all of the record before it and improperly denied the
Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. motion of Citizen Mast to take the deposition of Commissioner
Overson. Furthermore, even if the trial court properly limited the evidence that it
considered, the trial court erroneously granted the motion of Commissioner Overson
because the statements that were made regarding Citizen Mast and his relationship to
^U.C.A. §63-30-4(3)(a).
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C.T.U. were in fact defamatory as a matter of law. Privileged defenses either did not apply
as a matter of law or were subject to conflicting evidence as to their applicability.
For all of the foregoing, the Utah Court of Appeals should reverse the summary
judgment granted in favor of the Defendant and remand the case for reargument and
consideration of the defenses presented but not ruled upon after appropriate discovery has
been made.
DATED this 7th day of February, 1998.
NELSON, SNUBFER & DAHLE

Denver Snuffeij
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant David Mast
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby that two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S OPENING
BRIEF ON APPEAL was mailed, in accordance with Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, postage prepaid to:
Jay D. Gurmankin
Richard D. Flint
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
DATE this u\

day of February, 1998.
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ADDENDUM
1.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT before Honorable William H. Thorne
dated 9th day of June, 1997

2.

MEMORANDUM DECISION dated 1 st day of August, 1997
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ADDENDUM 1

IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY , STATE' "' !"' I'" I" MI
-oOo-

3
4

Ci vi 1 No. 960907782

Plaintiff,

5

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.

6

" PERSON,

7

(Videotape

Proceedings^

Defendant.

8

-oOo-

9

III

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 9th day of June,

I I

oiraaencing at the hour

r

*

the above-

111!

entitled matter came

u; II ^NORABL.E

WILLIAM H. THORNE, sitting as Judge in the above-named
purpose of thi s cause, and that the
.ollowing videotape proceedings were IlikulL
Hi

-oOo-

I I

": A JEL P E A. R A N C E S
laintiff:

tne Defendant:

24

DENVER C. SNUFFEI ., 1 IE
Attorney at Law
Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah
84070
JAY D. GURMANKIN
Attorney at Law
Berman, Gaufin # Tomsic &
Savage
50 South Main Street
Suite 1250
Salt Lake Ci

4

25

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR
-i

385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

V^'L-

''t^iyiffit

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

Okay.

We're on the

record in 960907782, Mast vs. Overson.
Counsel, would you make an appearance so the
record is complete?
MR. SNUFFER:

Denver Snuffer

appearing, your Honor, on behalf of the plaintiff, Mr.
Mast.
MR. GURMANKIN:

Jay Gurmankin and

Richard (inaudible) appearing for defendant, Brent
Overson.
THE COURT: Okay.

I understand you

have a guest with you; is that your daughter or your
associate's daughter?
MR. GURMANKIN:
This is my daughter, Tallia.

I do, your Honor.

(Inaudible) school today

and the clerk graciously offered to allow her to sit
here.
THE COURT: Well, that's fine, I
don't have a problem with that at all.
Okay.

I guess, Counsel, the first matter would

be 5(f), is it?
MR. SNUFFER: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
2

Mr. Snuffer?

SNUFFER:

Thank you, your Honor.

•i have new m i c r 0 p h 0 n e s
THE COURT:

You can bend that down

/ou want, as long as It's pointed
towards you,

record.
Kh

SNUFFER:

Well , 1 think i t

ackground, first
procedural background

vt

the moment, and then secondarily about what the facts are
Mb^tance of—of tho claim.
Procedurally, the Court should
lawsuit was filed on the 8th of November, 1996.
the attorney

During
:

-"*••••

defendant requested additional tinu LC prepare a response
-o the—to the complaint.
iwf iliscussed additional time to
~M e an answer; however,

uit subsequent

correspondence, it :c correct, as Mr. Gurmankin has
i i in I nanswer c i: otherwise
respond".

;u;

m

want Lo be too technical about that,

nut i t was agreed on December 30th, there was a letter
.. i i t :::' ::)i if I i: i
until January

areement - hat they would have
. ^

answer and then on

the 14th—excuse me, we gave them until January 16th.
asked for additional

3

time, we granted them additional time on January 14th to
January 27th.
So, they have the complaint in November, we
have the letters agreeing to continuances of their
response on December 30th and again on January 14th.
Their response was due on January 27th.
The response that they filed on January 27th
was a series of motions.

They filed a motion to:

Number

one, enlarge time to answer or respond to the complaint;
number two, to stay discovery in this case; and number
three, a motion for summary judgment.
Because of the pending motion to enlarge time
to file an answer, there has been no answer filed by the
defendant in this case.

At this moment, the pleadings

aren't closed.
Because of the motion to stay discovery, the
defendants have refused to cooperate in discovery pending
the outcome of these proceedings.
We noticed up the deposition of Brent Overson
initially in December.

We sent it for the end of

December, they refused to produce him.

We noticed up the

deposition of Brent Overson again for February the 18th.
Again, they refused to produce him.

We were told that

they would not produce him because there's a pending
motion to stay discovery.
4

Randy Dyer
I have a transcript c . those proceedings.

" '

He didn't show

up and won't show up unless there is a—unless there Is

THE COURT: Why were you taking his
deposition?

information, because of his involvement with Mr. Overson,
about the allegations that ->•-^ r~ * in this case.

the pleadings are not closed and there has been i 10
discovery conducted, although there has been discovery
attemptec

i i • • ei: y

• .

unti1 after you rule and L: yo,, rule t h a t the d i s c o v e r y
j s i ici) t stayed, then we'll be permitted by the defendant
to then engage in discovery.
That's—that's the procedural state V A we're

terms of the underlying relationship between
the parties, we filed an affidavit from Mr. Scott Simons
that talks about the background *••' -.he entity known as
the Concerned Taxpayer^
corporation,

: t. 's been involved—
THE COURT: The one that had lapsed

c;,.., :Y"*r* reinstated?

5

MR. SNUFFER:

Yes.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. SNUFFER:

It's been involved in a

variety of matters of public interest.

They were

involved in a dispute involving the Utah Transit
Authority.

There's actually a lawsuit filed by the

Concerned Taxpayers of Utah over the Utah Transit
Authority.
There was an issue involving Utah's bid for the
2002 Olympics, there were issues involving light rail
system and two of the Salt Lake County Commissioners
wanted to limit bids on the Salt Palace expansion
exclusively to union bids and Mr. Overson didn't want
that to happen.
He asked the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah to
intervene and assist with his view that it should be open
for everyone.

The Concerned Taxpayers of Utah did in

fact join in a lawsuit, among others, seeking to open the
bids up to something other than exclusively union bids.
As a result of that litigation, the bids were
opened up and non-union bids were permitted on that; so
Mr. Overson knows about the background of the Concerned
Taxpayers of Utah.
When the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah placed a
full-page ad in the newspaper, which is attached t o —
6

THE COURT:

It was one oi the

exhibits.
SNUFFER:

Right. Exhibit 28.

Nowhere—nowhere in » He document does **& name
"* David Mast appear
*ne

Nowhere.

oncerned Taxpayers of Utah.
i urn

about where
**,.

ID

II

It identifies it as a

i mi:a Iks about

* talks

i JIIM it and what

-epnune number

*w is t h e C o n c e r n e d —

f the directors —

r

Ve

THE COURTi

t Mr. M a s t o n e

officers identitiea wirh

Department of Corporations?
SNUFFER:
Mr. Mast.

Yes

I Hit this was n o t

This w a s a separate corporate entity called

*"? Poncerned Taxpayers of Utah.
,

(

i I

i

There was n o reason t o
l

^\

I»

MI

ilverson

Counsel,

like

. problem—
THE COURT:
i u r e s t i M "i i

i

i

i

i

i in

Okay.

in i I I |

i t i in I ni

'"I'll in

you get into t h e facts, if w e g e t that far.
MR. SNUFFER:

Okay.

response t o
esponse

attacked directly David Mast.
: doe.;:, t mention the Concerned
'. i .,

. -

whatever

7

1
2

yourself.
There have been various defenses that have been

3

asserted in a motion for summary judgment by the

4

defendant, which include as a substantive requirement,

5

that we show—assuming their defenses are valid—that it

8

requires us to show that Mr. Overson made the statements

7

that he made with malice, at the time that he made them.

8

And at this moment, the only thing that we can

9

say to the Court is, well, he made them with malice.

10

we're not allowed to go and cross-examine Mr. Overson

11

about his motivation, about the words he chose, about why

12

he chose them, about what he was thinking at the time

13

that he elected to do that, whether he considered the

14

effect that that would have, whether there were other

15

words he could have used to get the same message out, I

16

don't see how we can attack the alleged defenses that

17

have been raised.

18

If

When dealing with a 56(f) motion, the defendant

19

cite as their chief authority, the Callo vs. Progressive

20

Insurance Company case and in that case, it talks about

21

our obligation as a 56(f) movement, to show what steps

22

have been taken to obtain the desired information

23

pursuant to the discovery procedures under the rules.

24
25

We have notices of depositions as a matter of
record, it's in—in the—it's in the Court's file.
8

THE COURT:

But doesn't t h e case l a w

~^n-i require y o u to at least lay J it *:lir JaeiL juu lit'i-t/
or expect to find a s a result of that discovery?
SNUFFER:

And I believe that w e

did that -'- t h e affidavit of M r . Mast and

reply

memorandum.
attackinq t h e motivation of
Overson unless we're given access and an opportunity
to cross-examine him.
.:

T H E COURT i

Ok: i t ] »'

Bi :i I: a g a :i i :i th e c a s e

law se-:;ni5; to say that: laving all the facts ^. ...,..,„
- side and not ZL-

possession of

MR. SNUFFER:

ther is n o t — n o t ::::
Well —

THE COURT

-requirement.

THE COURT

Paragraph

Mast.

only through discovery.

a -;

That's the language that t h e

Supreme Court h a s said is insufficient.
r

.

I

|JTTT?T7T?P •

•

-

#

Paragraph 8, I question uit- claim of M r . Overson, that
was actinq under ? qualified privilege, that he deserves

9

Overson to challenge those claims and believe if I'm
permitted to do—to take his deposition, I will
successfully be able to do so.
Mr. Overson did not couch the statements he
made as opinions at the time of the news conference.
Without being able to obtain copies of video and audio
tapes and conduct the deposition of Mr. Overson, not be
able to fully oppose the allegation that this was an
expression of opinion; I need to take the deposition of
Mr. Overson in order to oppose the allegation that the
statements he made were in self defense.
Without the transcript of the video-audio
tapes, I can't take the deposition of Mr. Overson and
fully oppose the claim he makes that the statements were
made in self defense.

The statements were not self

defense, but rather an attack on me intended to disparage
and defame me and my reputation.
If there is a self defense here, it goes to the
concerned taxpayers of Utah, not Mr. David Mast
personally.
Without the deposition of Mr. Overson, I cannot
fully explore, challenge or refute the allegations he
makes that the statements were made to protect a
legitimate interest, a matter of public interest or his
claims of (inaudible)

10

Up

rntjfiff

|i,tuf*

*,||(|

(*K(>i

y | |) | 1141

without e v e r mentioning Dave Mast.
in t h e d i a l o g u e t h a t he engaged menti 01 11 i ig Mr

Mas t

I t wa

Midi

||p

-i r I I I I

He could have engaged
without e v e r

.

J I} • urmectisscir >• . i n I

gratuitous for the identity of an individual, the
personality of an individual to be singled out.
Why
THE COURT:

Okay.

Counsel, I th i nk

w e ' r e — y o u ' r e going into the merits of the case as
opposed t o , ;| ou pointed

c sedur e. t ::: s t:a

MR. SNUFFER:

Right.

Right.

And what I'm saying is w e believe the affidavit
Is sufficient U. r. .

-:

engage in discovery, particularly so when the pleadings
closed and there has been no discovery
permittee

.-. ;:..., point.
*:

Callo case, "; talks about, y o u — y o u

sh ::>i ill :ii i I: engage :i i :i purely- - c ishing expedition for
purely speculative facts after substantial disco ery lias
been conducted without producing any significant
evidence.
There has been 1 i U s e
case up to this moment
responded

None

Nothing has been

>.
Was there sufficient time sine.

JI

1

of the lawsuit for the party against whom the summary

2

judgment is sought to use discovery procedures and

3

thereby cross-examine the moving party?

4

We've attempted to do that.

We've been

5

attempting to do that since late December.

6

told they will not cooperate because of the pending

7

motion to stay discovery.

8

order staying discovery until the Court rules in this

9

case.

10

We've been

They act as if there is an

if discovery procedures were timely initiated,

11

was the non-moving party afforded an appropriate

12

response?

13

them to simply say, we're blowing you off until the Judge

14

tells us otherwise.

15

discovery.

Well, it's not an appropriate response for

16

We're entitled to have some

Their—

17

THE COURT:

Counsel, is there a

18

reason (Inaudible) not simply to consider as a motion to

19

dismiss as opposed to a summary judgment?

20

MR. SNUFFER:

21

it in terms of Rule 56.

22

56 motion.

23

Well, they've couched

I think it—I think it is a Rule

Are you suggesting you could dismiss it without

24

prejudice as a—as a motion to dismiss for failure to

25

state?

12

THE COURT:

If I accept your argument

that you haven't
SNUFFER:

Right.

THE COURT:

you meet
\

requirements, then another pos^i
with these motions is a motion tc dismiss.
i

Ill,

1,11 mi

claims cannot support

The defendant

' as a matter of law, certain
complaint,.
SNUFFER:

'~

nderstand that

matter of xaw, uiicj nave a
variety of privileges.
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

SNUFFER:

Assuming those

privileges are true, they still can be sued Jtur--tor
defamation, assuming the motivation that they have
motivation.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SNUFFER:
I

I

i 11 i I -Hi'i mill i(i'THE COURT:

argument

In order for me to get
hat becomes—
understand your

the merits, but I'm just asking you, is that
translate these motions

wi;

, ~ •• : understand you have „,, argument against grant.,
such a motion.
SNUFFER:
13

We] ] , 1 mean, ii \

1

fairness to the Court, I think you—I think you can do

2

that.

3

I think you can treat it as such.
I—I mean, standing here, it's my recollection,

4

that procedurally, that has been approved by the Court of

5

Appeals and I know that it has been done by District

6

Courts before.

7

you to do so; but let me suggest that if that were the

8

alternative or the option selected this morning, the

9

problem is that—that doesn't do anything to the

You wouldn't be plowing new ground were

10

litigants, that doesn't do anything to the issue and

11

we're still—I mean, the matter will be yet again raised

12

for yet another judge and as long as we've got you and

13

we've got the matter before you, it makes sense to not

14

bounce it, but to treat—I mean, we're back again to

15

serving process, filing, and you may draw the case again

16

in the random selection of the clerk's office.

17

So—

THE COURT: How long—how long do you

18

think you would need to conduct enough discovery to at

19

least address those motions?

20

MR. SNUFFER:

I believe that—that

21

the deposition of Mr. Overson himself is potentially

22

dispositive of all of their defense.

23

THE COURT: Okay.

24

MR. SNUFFER:

25

If we're given an

opportunity to take his deposition.
14

limited to just the questions

*

M-: SNUFFER:

Mr

>:-•- and n o t —
Just the questions—

SNUFFER:

at t m s moment, just

tue—the I ssues that have been raised ;summary judgment

the motion for

iswere*.

.-at their answer will include or if they will come up
!)

new defenses at some future moment.

10

T H E COURT,

11

MI-I SNUFFER:

12
13

r --

•*

15

But as to those matters

: issue because of summary judgment, that would

_ v.; .. • we would need L

11

IJOII: I" i; : J i .

La A

i

him about.

Another way to get. It and it might be more cost
-rjffective and—and it may be considerably more

16 | expeditious is for the Court to say, wait » minute,
answer.
18

Answer.

Frame the issues.

After you answer, then we'll take the

19

deposition of Mr. Overson and then., as one of the cases

20

suggest, you can renew—this is the—the Strand vs.

21 I Associated Students U of [J, the case is found at 561
2^ . Pacific Reporter at \<* .
23
22D

The Court says,

-*.;.-•

arant defendant's motion.
ordered the continuance to perm-.

abuse of discretion
urt should have
scovery or denied the

1

motion for summary judgment without prejudice to its

2

renewal, after adequate time had elapsed in which

3

plaintiff could have obtained the desired information.

4

i believe in the end, from the cases, you've

5

got considerable discretion at this moment.

6

there are limits on that and we, I think, are at the

7

extreme, an outrageous end of whether, is this an abuse?

8

I mean, no answer, no discovery, no cooperation in

9

discovery and summary judgment pending.

10

I think

i think wisdom being the better part of valor,

11

the thing to do would be to say, frame the issues, file

12

your answer, let's get the issue so we know what it is,

13

let's not take an incremental deposition and then take

14

another deposition if the ones asserted at that moment

15

failed—if the defenses asserted at that moment failed,

16

then think up some new ones, file your answer and then

17

they can talk to you about those new ones at that moment.

18

That seems rather—

19

THE COURT: Well, it's hard for me to

20

imagine finding new ones. This seems to be pretty

21

thorough.

22

MR. SNUFFER:

You never know.

23

Attorneys are so inventive. And I (inaudible) so M r . —

24

Mr. Gurmankin is inventive.

25

My suggestion would be that—that—
16

THE COURT
k^

mink,

I Ill

i urn iiiiriiik i l l ,

meant that as a compliment.
' TUFFER:

1 did.

x ^x^.

And my suggestion w o u l d —
MR. GURMANKIN:

MR. SNUFFER:

! just wish it were

My suggestion woui

to frame the pleadings, to continue the motion.
^ntiortunity
some discovery

" •-,*•
conduct

If this is t h e — t h e waterfronr

the

defenses that they intend to assert, fine; > there's yet
,uore out

LIIUMI:

i,"

~- ' ~

qive

us some pleading, give us an opportunity _, „ „,..,, at that
so.
Get

result

II In

jiifcJies

Irani*- 1 Il

ii n< I ill

niiiv 1""»«=J| t h . i t :

as

a
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proceedings come
homogenized into a single entity.

Their representative,

1

which is also present, watching these proceedings this

2

morning.

3

That would be my suggestion.

4

ought to bounce it as a — a s a motion to dismiss.

5

think it saves on Court time or the parties' time.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SNUFFER:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. GURMANKIN:

10

I don't think we
I don't

Okay.
Thank you.
Mr. Gurmankin?
Good morning, your

Honor.

11

First, just let me comment on a couple points

12

made by Mr. Snuffer in the course of his argument on the

13

56(f) motion.

14
15

First of all, I never promised him an answer.
i haven't promised anybody an answer i n —

16
17

THE COURT:

Sounds like the words to

a song.

18

MR. GURMANKIN:

19

in twenty years, I haven't promised anybody an answer.

20

— i n twenty answers—

Secondly, I never heard of this notice of

21

deposition of Randy Dryer or Randy Dyer.

22

surprise to me.

23

I—this is a — a

Third, I will tell the Court, and the record

24

will speak for itself, there's never been a proper notice

25

of deposition served on Mr. Overson; but I would have

18

opposed it and filed a motion for protective order along
with my motion for stay anyway.
My position is that on this record, the defen—
the plaintiff having failed to respond, at least to the
extent he could have, I think he could have responded
totally, everything that we've said in our statement of
facts is deemed admitted under Rule 56 and our papers go
unopposed.
I will tell the Court there's nothing
surprising about this procedure of filing a motion for
summary judgment in response to a complaint.
We've cited in our papers to Professor
Mooresbook and I'll cite the Court—I was reading through
the advance sheets the other day, why I was reading that
as opposed to things about the Jazz, I don't know; but in
my small and meaningless life, I was looking at the
advance sheets and I found a case called Thrower vs.
Barney. 849 F.Supp 1445, a Federal District Court
opinion.
As your Honor knows, under the Federal rules,
we don't have any discovery for about 120 days and the
Court said, the amended rules contemplate that no
discovery shall be undertaken until after the parties
meet and confer; however, they don't stand in the way of
filing a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary

19

1

judgment before discovery.

2

That's what the defendants did in this case and

3

because the Court basically said there's nothing—

4

nothing—no discovery here is going to help you, it

5

couldn't, as a matter of law, the Court dismissed the

6

case.

7

There's no question under the—the law stated

8

in Callio vs. Progressive Insurance, which we've cited

9

and which Mr. Snuffer alluded to, that the 56(f)

10

affidavit and the 56(f) motion are completely inadequate

11

to raise any questions.

12

And—and that Court—the Court said the Callio

13

conclusary assertion that schedules deposition (sic) were

14

expected to produce matters essential to resolution of

15

the defendant's motion, that's exactly what Mr. Mast's

16

affidavit is.

17

kinds of areas he could explore that would—that would

18

raise issues of controverted fact with respect to the

19

things I ~

20

It doesn't really tell us at all what

THE COURT:

I—I think I agree with

21

you in terms of the affidavit, but there are three parts

22

to that requirement the Judge (inaudible) and I'm

23

concerned about the second requirement.

24
25

The one that says, was there sufficient time
since the inception of the lawsuit for the party against
20

whom summary judgment is sought—
MR. GURMANKIN:
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

— t o use discovery

procedures and by cross-examining the moving party.
MR. GURMANKIN:

And—and my answer to

that, your Honor, and the reason we filed this motion to
stay discovery is because on the record we've made and
the—the documents, the law, no matter what Mr. Overson
says at his deposition, this case still has to be
dismissed as a matter of law, for a number of reasons.
THE COURT:

Even with the presence of

malice, if they're able to document that?
MR. GURMANKIN:

Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GURMANKIN:

The answer is yes.

THE COURT: Tell me.
MR. GURMANKIN:
need to get to the merits.

And to do that, I

I—let me just say, and I

won't go through all the other law in 56(f) where the
Courts always say, you can't just file conclusary
statements.
I wonder about the questions they'd ask Mr.
Overson about malice, but—but let me say, there's two
kinds of malice that float around these cases.

The one

is in the Constitutional sense to get around New York

21

Times vs. Sullivan, knowing something's false or reckless
disregard of the fact.
The other is common law malice and that's what
comes up in these qualified privileges and that's ill
will and for a number of reasons, as a matter of law, no
matter what Mr. Overson says at his deposition on this
record, you can determine there was no malice, but I will
also tell the Court that on another—number of our
defend—defenses, malice is irrelevant.
Mr. Overson had the right to defame him, even,-if he did, I don't concede that—and because of the
limited scope of what Mr. Overson said in defense of
himself—by the way, Mr. Mast's name is all over these
documents and I'll show them to you—as a matter of law,
there is no malice. And we've cited cases on that and
this Court can decide that as a matter of law.
So, Mr. Snuffer's obligation under the 56(f)
motion was to show what kinds of issues he could raise at
this deposition that would go to show the kind of malice
that would get around our arguments. He didn't do that
and he didn't say anything that could possibly redo a
dis—to a controverted fact on absolute immunity, on the
absolute defense that this is opinion, which I think you
can decide, as a matter of law, on the absolute defense
based on this record under Utah law that this—these

22

statements are not, even if he made them, capable of a
defamatory meaning.
So, if Mr. Overson, for example, sat in his
deposition and said, yeah, I don't like Mr. Mast, that's
not the kind of malice that will get around here.
The cases that I'm going to go into, when we
get to the merits, are going to show that if somebody is
attacked, as he was, attacked as having done things wrong
and attacked as having done things criminal, publicly
attacked by Mr. Mast, not just by the C.T.U.—and—and
I'll show, I think, that it is a ruse, not only were his
statements all true, but they were carefully limited in
scope to defend himself.
If your Honor looks at the complaint, there's
not a lot.

All he said was there was an add that was

done by a bunch of people, all the commissioners, parks
and recreation, you know, I mean that ad has nothing
defamatory in it.
THE COURT:

(Inaudible) publications

by an election committee?
MR. GURMANKIN:

Well, that's what he

says except the ad is—is not that—"The Facts" ad is not
that.

I have it here, it's in the record.
The other thing he said, all he said was none

of the things he said is true—are true. This is Overson
23

1

talking, and that's clear on the record, and then he

2

said, how long does a public official have to put up with

3

a bunch of defamation or lies?

4

Assuming that's a defamatory statement in the

5

first place, which I doubt it is, because of the context

6

and in the West case, the Utah Supreme Court talked about

7

the importance of context with respect to whether

8

something is capable of a—of a defamatory meaning, all

9

he was doing was defending himself.

10

The question is, would someone believe that

11

that has cast enough aspersions on Mr. Mast to—to ruin—

12

cause him some kind of ruination?

13

claimed to be defamatory per se.

14

Was—it's not even

So, what kinds of questions can he ask Mr.

15

Overson that matter on this record?

16

that given the eight or nine legal defenses that I've

17

invented, that—and by the way, I may have one or two

18

more, if we ever did have to answer, but I haven't raised

19

them because they might create questions of fact.

20

don't create any questions of fact.

21

And my position is,

These

And I will say for the record that Mr. Snuffer

22

has completely failed to do what he has to do and I'll

23

just talk about one case on 56(f) and that is the party

24

filing the affidavit must show how additional time will

25

enable him to rebut movant's allegations of no genuine

24

1

issue of fact.

2

Not just that there hasn't been time, but how

3

can he show that he could rebut any of our facts with

4

facts that are material. He hasn't done that, he failed

5

under 56(f).

6

Not only that, not only did he fail to—to do

7

that, he didn't—he didn't even try to refute all the

8

facts that he has the possession of.

9

didn't deny he's a competing developer.

He didn't—he
He didn't deny

10

he went to Doug Short and tried to get a grand jury

11

convened.

12

attacks that the C.T.U. and he made.

13

He didn't deny that he was responsible for the

He could have denied those and his duty under

14

Rule 56(f) was to do that independent of 56(f).

15

this record naked, and I will say, your Honor, two

16

things: One, he hasn't met his burden under 56(f) to

17

allow for more discovery, and even more important, this

18

record stands unrebutted and as a matter of law, our

19

facts have to be deemed admitted and we're entitled to

20

summary judgment.

21

Now, I'll get to the merits later.

He left

And I'll

22

answer any questions the Court has. Mr. Snuffer took a

23

big risk by doing what he did and he violated Rule 56.

24
25

And I'll—let me say one thing.
immunity.

Absolute immunity.

25

Absolute

No facts can go to that.

Obviously, Mr. Overson is the executive of the county.
How is—how is discovery going to—going to change that?
THE COURT: Mr. Snuffer?
MR. SNUFFER:

Yeah.

I think the

Callo case and the requirement under the second part of
the test is consistent with the predecessor, the Strand
case that I referred you to earlier, and I'd like to read
from it.
Unless dilatory or lacking in merits, the
motion should be liberally treated.

Exercising a sound

discretion, the trial court then determines whether the
stated reasons are adequate.
And they—they talked about how in this case
there had not been sufficient time since the inception of
the lawsuit for plaintiff to utilize discovery procedures
and thereby have an opportunity to cross-examine the
moving party.

The pleadings had not been closed, there

were complex, legal issues posed with an inadequate
factual basis.
Under such circumstances, it was an abuse of
discretion to grant the defendant's motion.

The Court

should have ordered a continuance to permit discovery or
denied the motion for summary judgment without prejudice
to its renewal after adequate time had elapsed in which
plaintiff could have obtained the desired information.
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1

I wanted to point out, you asked about the

2

deposition of Randy Dryer.

3

point, the attorney who represented Mr. Overson in which

4

Mr. Overson and Randy Dryer met with representatives of

5

the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah including not just Mr.

6

Mast, but multiple other parties.

7

Randy Dryer was, at one

The spokesman of that meeting was Randy Doyle

8

and Dryer and Overson and Doyle, with Mast sitting in the

9

background, listening, reached an agreement in which they

10

went forward with a policy change that saved the

11

taxpayers ultimately a considerable amount of money.

12

For Mr. Overson now to come along a couple of

13

years later and say, Dave Mast is the alter ego of and

14

this is all motivated by and Mr. Mast, Mr. Mast, Mr. Mast

15

is wrong.

16
17

THE COURT:

But you didn't controvert

that in your affidavit.

18

MR. SNUFFER:

Well, the question is

19

not what the facts are, because the—the supporting

20

information attached to their own motion demonstrates

21

that the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah and David Mast are

22

two separate entities.

They demonstrate that.

23

The question is, should Mr. Overson who knows

24

the statement to have been false, get away with calling

25

Dave Mast a liar because of something the Concerned
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1

Taxpayers of Utah did.

2

And he's turning Mr. Mast into Concerned

3

Taxpayers of Utah and blasting Mr. Mast personally as a

4

liar, when his gripe, if there is one, is with the

5

Concerned Taxpayers of Utah.

6

And that's what the attorney's doing for him,

7

too.

8

and we're saying, no, no, you can't do that.

9

Gurmankin is getting up here and homogenizing them,

And if we had had the deposition of Mr. Dryer,

10

we would demonstrate to you that there is ample history

11

that goes back over years that Mr. Overson knows the

12

difference between David Mast, on the one hand, and the

13

Concerned Taxpayers of Utah.

14

he wanted to call anyone a liar, he should aim more

15

accurately and not at the individual.

16

And if he had it right and

His gripe, if there was one, was with the

17

Concerned Taxpayers of Utah.

18

before you in this record and I would return again to the

19

statement made in the U of U Students case that the

20

pleadings aren't closed, no discovery has been permitted.

21

That's certainly adequately

We're at something before a preliminary state

22

in this case, notwithstanding what happens on the Federal

23

side, which some folks think is inefficient and dilatory

24

just by its very nature, I mean it gives Federal District

25

Court Judges just a lot of time and magistrates a lot of
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1

time before they have to do anything in a case that's

2

initiated; thankfully, we don't have that here.

3

And we should have been—I mean, this case

4

began in November and here we are, arguing a motion

5

months later with them taking the stonewall approach to

6

the case because of pending motions,

7

i think we should get on, conduct some

8

discovery, close the—frame the pleadings, close the

9

pleadings and give us an opportunity.

10

They can renew

their motion.

11

At this point, the only one that's been

12

prejudiced in this is the plaintiff.

13

filed a bunch of motions and sat back and done nothing

14

and they'll continue to do nothing unless the Court

15

orders otherwise.

16

The defendants have

if the Court has questions, I'm prepared to

17

speak further, but I think the matter is before your

18

Honor.

19
20

Thank you.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Gurmankin?

21

MR. GURMANKIN:

22

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Point me towards the—I

23

now that you are suggesting that—that all eight or nine

24

of your arguments survive any kind of a factual inquiry.

25

MR. GURMANKIN:
29

Uh huh.

THE COURT:

So, help me walk through

those and show me why whatever Mr. Snuffer discovers on
discovery would make no difference,
MR. GURMANKIN:

All right.

And I'll-

-I'll do it quickly, your Honor, I won't g o —
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GURMANKIN:

First ground.

Incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a matter
of law.

Under the West case and the Cox case, they are

clearly under Utah law a question of law; in other words,
the question whether something's capable of the
defamatory meaning is a question of law based on the
context.
THE COURT: Uh huh.
MR. GURMANKIN:

And here, you have

plenty of context that there had been attacks on—on Mr.
Overson by Mast, not just the C.T.U., but by Mr. Mast
personally, it's in the record.

Goes and tries to get a

grand jury convened, all Mr. Overson did was protect
himself and my position is as a matter of law, no matter
what was in his mind, that statement—and you know, all
those statements are always made with some ill will,
that's incapable of defamatory meaning.
Absolute executive officer—oh, no, immunity is
the second one.

The Fender case we've cited.
30

That is an

absolute immunity to defame--*
i

THE COURT:

No, no, let me back up

for just a second, Mr. Gurmankin—
MR. GURMANKIN:
THE COURT:

Okay.

— a n d deal with one of

them at a time.
MR. GURMANKIN:
THE COURT:

All right.

And I don't mean t o —

MR. GURMANKIN:

I'm sorry, I was

just—
THE COURT:

—past my threshold with

hanging on to all of those ideas.
MR. GURMANKIN:

And I—your Honor, I-

-I hate to interrupt, but I have—I'm ready to go into
each one of more at more length, if your Honor—
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, maybe we

ought to take that approach then.
The incapable of defamatory meaning, from
reading the complaint, there's one area that they deal
with that ad and the response; but isn't there also sort
of a general pleading that—I'm having difficulty in
pinning down as to what—what you're talking about.
How can you say that whatever that is is
incapable of defamatory meaning when I'm not sure what it
is they're complaining about?
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MR. GURMANKIN:

Okay.

The complaint

says what they're complaining about, which was an ad—let
me get it, your Honor.
May I speak from the—
THE COURT:

Sure. That's fine.

MR. GURMANKIN:

Because I will fumble

less.
THE COURT:

That's fine.

That's

fine.
MR. GURMANKIN:

The complaint.

only has two areas which they claim are defamatory.

It
One

is that the defendant accused plaintiff of being a liar
and that the C.T.U. is an alleged ruse.
And secondly was a newspaper ad, the facts.
Your Honor, obviously, when a party is confronted with a
motion for summary judgment, the party cannot rely on the
pleadings, he—but has to make a record of what the
statements were.
That's one of the things that troubles me about
this. Where are the defamatory statements?
There's two of them.

All right.

One of them is this: The facts.

Exhibit 31 to the Ellis affidavit, signed by Randy
Horiuchi, Mary Callahan, the mayor of Draper, Mr.
Overson, the County Parks Board chair and the County Golf
Advisory chair and I will ask the Court to read this and
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1

determine as a matter of law not only is the word, David

2

Mast not mentioned, not only is the C.T.U. not mentioned,

3

but there is nothing in here that a person in the

4

farthest stretch of his or her imagination could conclude

5

is defamatory.

6

not defamatory 'cause there's nothing negative said about

7

it in here at all.

8
9

It's just—it's just as a matter of law

Okay.

That's one of their bases.

Second basis is the press conference.
put it in the record.

So we

And at the press conference, Mr.

10

overson did say, and we admit for the purposes of this

11

motion, that the C.T.U. is a ruse and he didn't—he

12

didn't call Mr. Mast a liar, what he said was, he asked

13

in exasperation, How long does a public official have to

14

put up with attacks?

15

so, what he said was, full page newspaper ad is

16

politically motivated, mean-spirited and a sham.

17

submit to you as a matter of law, none of that is

18

defamatory.

19

I

The ad was placed for and paid for by David

20

Mast.

21

that wasn't controverted.

22

law, that's true, because they admitted and there's facts

23

in the record and he obviously did pay for the ad and if

24

he said he didn't, I think he'd be perjuring himself.

25

We have evidence in the record to that extent and
That's true. As a matter of

David Mast is a real estate developer.
33

No

1

question.

2

don't think he'll deny it today.-

3

by the way.

4

true.

It's in the record, he hasn't denied it, I
He's a competitor, too,

South Mountain is his competitor, that's

So, so far, everything he says is true.

5

Under the separate name of the Concerned

6

Taxpayers of Utah, David Mast has attacked my character

7

and integrity.

8

newspaper articles which lump Mr. Mast with the Concerned

9

Taxpayers of Utah, he—they say he does fund the group's

10
11

Well, I put in the record a number of

endeavors.
He stands to make about $9 million from his

12

Draper site subdivision, the group's efforts aren't

13

likely to subside and Mast wouldn't have much trouble

14

funding a mayoral campaign.

15

Mast is quoted as saying, I feel I'm in a

16

position that I could not only say something about an

17

issue, but I could do something about it.

18

I can put ads in papers, I can litigate it if I have to.

19

And—and their Exhibits 8, 30 and 29 show that

I have money,

20

it is Mast attacking Overson, so Overson's self-defense

21

was against things directly said by Mast.

22

He goes on.

He asks some questions and again

23

this is the text of the press conference and at the end,

24

he said, and this is the only thing I guess to even get

25

close to thinking about defamation in the whole—in the
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1

whole record, Isn't it a shame that a public official has

2

to subject himself to threats, personal lawsuits, which

3

by the way there have been by the C.T.U., lies or

4

character assassination.

5

call yourself, I will not shrink from my public duties.

6

The purchase of the South Mountain Golf Course is the

7

right thing for golf in Salt Lake County.

8
9

David Mast, or whatever you

Now, all my arguments on summary judgment
assume that's defamatory, but I think your Honor has to

10

ask yourself, is that defamatory?

11

Isn't it a shame that a person in my position has to put

12

up with this and there's no question.

13

Okay.

The guy just says,

This is the C.T.U. ad.

He accuses Brent

14

Overson of scams, misleading the public, meeting behind

15

closed doors, refusing to provide documents under GRAMA

16

requests.

17

THE COURT:

But don't-

is

MR. GURMANKIN:

19

THE COURT:

20

defenses of self-defense and consent and so forth?

That—that would g o —

That goes to your other

21

MR. GURMANKIN:

Yeah.

And—well, and

22

the position of Mr. Overson that he found himself in,

23

that's right.

24

But—but more important, there is a letter we

25

put in the record from Doug Short to Neal Gunnarson and
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there's a newspaper article that says that—there's a
newspaper article that says that David Mast took ads out
on—on behalf of his organization, accuses Overson o f —
David Mast's ad—this is in the newspaper—accuses
Overson of violating State law by meeting behind closed
door.
By the way, Judge Medley had dismissed those
allegations with prejudice. And then it says that Mast
is asking the Utah Attorney General's office to convene a
grand jury, so these—these publications in the press
before the—four days before the press conference talked
about what Mast had done in attacking Mr. Overson.

They-

-this doesn't controvert that.
He doesn't need to depose Brent Overson to
determine whether he said that he tried to get a grand
jury convened or whether he accused Brent Overson of
violating the open meetings act, doesn't need that; but
the point is, Mast had directly attacked Overson.
So, on this—on the case law on something not
being capable of having a defamatory meaning, in the
context of this, I think the Supreme Court of Utah, under
the West case, that he cited and Judge Durham wrote a
long opinion, would say—
THE COURT:

More—more footnote than

I wanted to read in that opinion.
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1

MR. GURMANKIN:

And I.

More

2

footnotes than I wanted to read, too; but I think under

3

the West case, it's pretty clear that this Court can rule

4

as a matter of law, given that context and without regard

5

to what was in Brent Overson's mind at the time, hey,

6

there's no—there's no defamatory meaning.

7
8

so, that's the first one that doesn't require
Mr. Overson's deposition.

9
10

THE COURT:
to deal with that one?

11
12

MR. SNUFFER:

I do.

Well, could I stay here and—

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SNUFFER:

15

Mr. Snuffer, do you want

Oh, sure.
—speak into this?

I was trying to find where we mention it in our

16

pleadings and I can't find it conveniently, but I know

17

it's in there, because it's—it's of record, I read it

18

again last night.

19

One of the things that Mr. Overson did was to

20

stand u p — h e called a press conference, he invited the

21

television stations, the newspapers and the radio

22

stations, unlike the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, that

23

placed only a newspaper ad.

24
25

He called this press conference.

At the press

conference, he says Mr. Mast is the alter ego of
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Concerned Taxpayers, Concerned Taxpayers is the alter ego
of David Mast, who are the same entity, Mast, Mast, Mast,
Mast.
Thereafter, as we mentioned in our pleadings,
the news media started calling Mast through Concerned
Taxpayers, Mast, through Concerned Taxpayers.
MR. GURMANKIN:

Your Honor, I'm going

to—I shouldn't do this—
THE COURT: No. Just a second.
Mr. Gurmankin suggested in his argument that
four days before, the newspapers had already made that
connection; is that not the case?
MR. SNUFFER:

That's not the case.

They had spoken with him and he has—he has says—he has
said this repeatedly.

In fact, I'm trying to find the

quote—
THE COURT:

Okay.

But in your—in

your complaint, let's narrow it down to things in your
complaint, you complained about a newspaper ad that's
called "The Factsw?
MR. SNUFFER: Yes.
THE COURT: And that's available and
on record.

And then it says that your other complaint,

in Paragraph 5, is that he called your client a liar and
that the—
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1

MR. SNUFFER:

2

THE COURT:

3

That was—

—organization was

involved in a ruse.

4

MR. SNUFFER:

Okay.

And he talked—

5

you talked about the statement that was made in—in—the

6

22nd of August.

7

Exhibit 30, where Overson said, quote, "This is a

8

competitor who is not happy with this transaction.

9

concerned Taxpayers of Utah is a ruse, it's strictly a

10
11
12

Look at that on the 22nd of August,

front for David Mast."
MR. GURMANKIN:

I'm sorry, what is

the name of that, your Honor?

13

THE COURT: Okay.

14

MR. GURMANKIN:

15

Could I get the

exhibit number of that?

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. SNUFFER:

18

In any event, what Mr. Overson—

19

THE COURT:

I think he said 30.
30. Exhibit 30.

And what—help me find

20

the defamatory contents in light of the context that

21

Justice Durham said we'd have to find.

22

This

MR. SNUFFER:

Okay.

Look at Exhibit

23

No. 33. Because I'm the only commissioner facing re-

24

election, I've been singled out by David Mast as a scape

25

goat for South Mountain.

It's not true.
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He was singled

out because he's the one that was meeting with South
Mountain, he's the one that wanted this program to go
through, he's the one that involved himself individually
and he was singled out, not by Mr. Mast, but by the
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah.
Under the deceptive name of Concerned Taxpayers
of Utah, David Mast has attacked my character and
integrity.

David Mast didn't, under the deceptive name

of the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah do anything.
There's an entire board, there's an entire
body.

Mr. Mast, on his own, can do nothing on behalf of

the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah.
THE COURT:

Isn't this, though, the

kind of expression of opinion that Justice Durham was
talking about in that case?

I mean, it's clear that—

MR. SNUFFER: The—THE COURT:

—the Court of Appeals

held one way—
MR. SNUFFER:
THE COURT:

Okay.

—and the Supreme Court

apparently found it was another.
MR. SNUFFER:

I think there's a

distinction here and I think that the defense would lie
if what Mr. Overson said was, Concerned Taxpayers of
Utah, Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, Concerned Taxpayers of
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Utah.
What he did was change the dialogue.

He left

the entity responsible for making the statement and moved
on to an individual and he attached the individual.
You read this press statement and what he's
saying in it is, among other things, David Mast commits
lies, David Mast commits character assassination, David
Mast is the alter ego of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah,
David Mast, or whatever you call yourself—I mean,
throughout it, he's attempting to focus not upon the
statements or the entity making the statements in which I
concede that's where this defense lies of it lies at all,
but the dialogue's been changed, though.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Is that any

different, though, than the political debate that goes on
every election year that Bob Dole or Bill Clinton have
said whatever their subordinates have—have talked to the
press about, they're not responsible?
MR. SNUFFER:

Certainly it is, but

Mr. Mast is not a candidate for any office and Mr. Mast
didn't engage in publication of the ad.

The ad was

published by a committee.
THE COURT: He didn't—he didn't fund
the ad? Mr. Gurmankin said that he paid for the ad.
believe he said he wasn't involved—
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I

1

MR. SNUFFER:

I believe that t h e —

2

yeah.

3

Concerned Taxpayers of Utah get donations from parties.

4

Among others, Mr. Mast contributed—

I believe that the way it operated was, the

5
6

THE COURT:
they're going to spend it.

7
8

And then they decide how

MR. SNUFFER:
spend it.

And they decide how to

They decided to run the ad.

9

THE COURT:

10

Okay.

MR. SNUFFER:

He contributed to

11

Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, Concerned Taxpayers of Utah

12

paid for the ad.

13

for the entire ad?

Were his contributions enough to pay
At this moment, I don't know.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SNUFFER:

16

There were other

people's money used—

THE COURT:

17
18

I~

But—but :you're telling

us, there was never any decision there by-—

19

MR. SNUFFER :

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SNUFFER,:

Correct.

Okay.
And another party in

22

there>, and if this defense liesi, it lies <as a statement

23

made by Mr. Overson, vis-a-vis, Concerned Taxpayers of

24

Utah.

25

assassins, if you will, call them being less than candid,

Call. them liars, if you will, call them character
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if you will, fine; he didn't do that. What he did was
say, Mr. Mast is a liar, Mr. Mast engages in alter ego to
this (inaudible) Mr. Mast, Mr. Mast.
And I'm saying to the extent that that defense
lies, if it lies at all, it lies for another party who's
not before the Court.

I think that's—that's a

distinction and it's a—and it's a significant one, one
on which I think we're entitled under 56(f) to explore,
which is all we're asking for at this moment.
THE COURT: Okay. And Exhibit 33 is
the press release then that—
MR. SNUFFER:
THE COURT:

If—

—that you're complaining

about?
MR. SNUFFER:

Yes. But what happened

was Mr. Overson called a press conference and read this
at the press conference.

There were representatives from

the newspapers, from the television statements—stations
and from the press and they asked questions and he
answered them afterwards.
This is what he said, okay, this is what he
said in his prepared statement, but there was some
dialogue that went on afterwards.
THE COURT:
your discovery would be t o —
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Okay. And the purpose of

MR. SNUFFER:
THE COURT:

Flush out not only—

—find out of he knew

these things were not true?
MR- SNUFFER:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Okay.

MR. SNUFFER:

And—

Oh, and he did know,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And if you can

establish that, that he knew these things were not true,
do you think that's enough to get past—
MR. SNUFFER:
Absolutely.

Absolutely.

At that moment, it's a question of fact; in

fact, at that moment, it's probably not going to be
tried, but probably the parties are going to have a
dialogue and see if we can resolve this,
Mr. Overson has been less than candid with the
public in what he said here and Mr. Overson is being very
clever about the defenses that are being asserted at this
moment, trying to continue to homogenize an individual
with a corporate entity and it just won't wash.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Mr. Gurmankin, on number two, the absolute
executive officer immunity.
You—you can do it from the table, if you want,
or you can do it at the podium, either way.
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MR- GURMANKIN:

I—it's a (inaudible)

reaction, your Honor.
This is a common law—
THE COURT:

I mean, if there was such

an immunity, the Supreme Court wouldn't have issued the
decision they did a couple weeks ago.
MR. GURMANKIN:
THE COURT:

I'm not sure—

Paula Jones and the

president.
MR. GURMANKIN:

Oh.

Well, I guess

the first distinction that comes to mind is—well, no,
your Honor, that's—that wasn't a defamation action.
That wasn't a defamation action.
This—and when we talk about defamation, we're
talking about speech and the necessity of carrying out
functions.

I admit that there were some speech involved

in the allegations by Paula Jones, but it was a different
kind of speech.
The common law recognize an absolute privilege
for State and local executive officers who publish
defamatory matter in the course of performing their
executive duties.
We cited a number of cases and some—including
Fender vs. City of Oregon City,—
THE COURT:
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So—and so if this

clearly had been at a council meeting, that would be one
thing?

But what about press conferences?
MR. GURMANKIN:

Yes, And in Fenderr

at a press conference, the mayor got up and, at a press
conference, talked about the prior city manager, prior
city manager sued for defamation and the Court, the
Federal Court said, under Oregon law, the executive
officers have an absolute privilege to publish defamatory
material in the course of performing their executive
duties and held that it made no difference that it was
done at a press conference because it was in the context
of duties.
The South Mountain development issue clearly
was part of Mr. Overson's duties as a county
commissioner; frankly, was carried out properly.

Mr.

Mast didn't like it, but he was defending himself.
And one of the things he was doing, after that
newspaper article, by the way, uncontrovertedly, after
that newspaper article, was try to get people to
understand that, hey, these things that they're—that
Mast is saying about me aren't true. I'm not a criminal,
you know, I — I — I didn't do anything wrong•

I didn't

have any secret meetings.
And by the way, I'm going to get to that in a
minute. All these statements are true.
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Truth is a

defense as a matter of law in this case, but a s — a s —
THE COURT: Well, that's a matter of
fact, though, I mean, that—
MR. GURMANKIN:
THE COURT:

Well, I'm saying—

If we get to that point,

then we're obviously getting past summary judgment.
MR. GURMANKIN:

No. My—no, my point

would be that no reasonable fact finder could find other
than they're true, no matter what discovery is taken; but
let me stay with this.
THE COURT: Well—
MR. GURMANKIN:

Clearly, at this

press conference, Mr. Overson had absolute immunity as an
executive to make those statements, if they were
defamatory.

And that's absolute.

Nothing he esti—I mean, nobody's going to deny
Mr. Overson—
THE COURT:

So, Mr. Overson could get

up at a press conference and talk about somebody's
personal, private life, make things up and he has an
absolute defense?
MR. GURMANKIN:

If he went beyond his

duties in dealing with South—South Mountain, then
perhaps not; but as long as he was talking in the
confines of what he had done and what—

47

THE COURT: Well, let's say it's
within the confines of South Mountain, he could get up
and say, Mr. Mast is a so-and-so and does these things to
kids and this to this and he would have absolute
immunity?
MR. GURMANKIN:

The answer to that

is, as long as it's in the course of performing his
executive duties, yes.
And that's similar to the speech and debate
clause of the—of the Constitution.
THE COURT:

But the—doesn't the fact

question come up when he crosses that line to—in terms
of personal versus official duties?
MR. GURMANKIN:

I think that's a

question of law for the Court on this record.

I don't

see how any reasonable fact finder could find other than
under this record that he was dealing with South Mountain
in defending himself against Mr. Mast's attack.
And—and when someone says, Isn't it a shame
that a public official has to put up with that, and it's
in the context of having told people, hey, what was done
here was kosher; he didn't—he didn't attack him on any
kind of grounds outside of defending himself from the
attacks that were all concerned with South Mountain.
So, yeah, my position—and it's like the speech
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1

and debate clause of the Constitution,

2

in Congress and says something horribly defamatory, it's

3

not—it's not actionable.

4

THE COURT: Well—

5

MR. GURMANKIN:

6

Somebody gets up

Now, thank goodness

(inaudible)

7

THE COURT:

—but in Congress, they

8

can literally say anything.

See, it doesn't have to be

9

officially related, they can say anything—

10

MR. GURMANKIN:

11

THE COURT: —and there's an absolute

12

That's right.

defense there.

13

MR. GURMANKIN:

And—and here, I

14

guess, your Honor, if your Honor says well, if there was

15

something in the record that would allow you to make a

16

determination that maybe there's a question of fact as to

17

whether he was operating within his duties, we'd have a

18

different question, but there's nothing in the record on

19

that.

20

You have the words and you have the—the reason

21

I made this record so complete was 'cause you have all

22

the context there is.

23

THE COURT: Well, I guess I still

24

have a question even looking at all those, was he

25

defending himself as an individual or was he defending
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1

the policies that he had supported as an official, or a

2

little bit of both at that conference?

3

MR. GURMANKIN:

Well, I would say

4

that he—if he was doing both, it's still subject to that

5

absolute immunity because keeping the public's confidence

6

in the integrity of a public official as an individual is

7

just as important.

8
9

THE COURT: Maybe I just grew up at
the wrong time. That sounds an awful lot like Watergate

10

to me.

I mean, where you—you say the defense of the

11

individual is really the defense of the institution.

12

MR. GURMANKIN:

If he had committed

13

burglary, that would be a different case.

14

press conference, after he'd been attacked, and said,

15

isn't it a shame that somebody has to put up with this,

16

right after he had gone through the facts about South

17

Mountain.

18

He got up in a

So, I don't see that it was an individual

19

attack on Mr. Mast or it was an individual defense

20

outside the context and that, I think all these cases are

21

clear, the Court can determine that from the record as a

22

matter of law.

23

THE COURT:

I—I mean I think it's—I

24

think you're right in the sense that it's clear that the

25

South Mountain controversy is what brought this to a
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1

head, but I—still lingering in the back is this

2

question, Where do you cross the line between defending

3

yourself and official duties?

4

MR. GURMANKIN:

5

THE COURT: And there is a line

6

someplace.

And that—that i s —

I guess I'm having trouble just defining it.

7

MR. GURMANKIN:

That's why 56(f) was

8

written as it has, it was counsel's job to show the Court

9

what kinds of questions are pertinent to that line and he

10
11

failed completely to do that.
And I'm not—I'm not trying to be disrespectful

12

of your Honor in this; I mean, we have me up here who's

13

made a record and taking my position and you're looking

14

to see—you're testing the limits of that, and that's—

15

that's legitimate.

16

That's legitimate.

And—but I think it's clearly on the record we

17

have such that Mr. Overson was talking about South

18

Mountain, so what kinds of questions to—put to Mr.

19

Overson would create a controverted question of fact?

20

And I—I fail to see that—that there could be

21

one and certainly, it was not proposed as far as the

22

56(f) affidavit.

23

THE COURT: Okay.

24

MR. GURMANKIN:

25

All right.

Good faith belief as to the truth and I think—
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Truth.

1
2

THE COURT:

Well, where are y o u — i s

this still on the absolute—

3

MR. GURMANKIN:

4

one of these allegations of malice, common law malice

5

requires that the plaintiff prove both falsity and some

6

intent to harm.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. GURMANKIN:

9

good faith belief as to the truth.

Oh.

Yeah, under any

Uh huh.
Mr. Overson had a
He had been attacked

1°

by Mr. Mast, as reported in the paper, for not turning

11

over records, including his election disclosures, his

12

election—his campaign finance disclosures.

13

if your Honor will look at Exhibit 23 of the

14

Ellis affidavit, you711 find a list of the thousands of

15

documents that were disclosed in the document—in the

16

GRAMA request of the C.T.U.

17

uncontrovertedly, disclosed everything that needed to be

18

and that's what led to Judge Medley's dismissal of that

19

case only days before this case was filed.

20

He had indeed,

Mr. Mast accused the county of not intending to

21

take title to the property.

He put the document in the

22

record that shows that the golf course was, if the deal

23

went through, going, indeed, to become county property.

24

There's nothing controverted in that, so that Mr. Overson

25

obviously had a good faith belief in the truth of that,
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the real estate purchase documents say that.

And I think

Judge Medley's dismissal lent credence to that.
I'll cite the Court to the Gregory vs. Durham
County case for that and I'd like—I'd like to read the
Court, and these are decisions that the Court's made as a
matter of law on records.
I'd like to read from two cases I've cited that
go to this question.

One is Piper vs. Foe, this was a

bitter campaign in Wyoming, and by the way, this was a
campaign, too. Obviously, Mr. Mast, who—the competing
developer was hurt by the papers, didn't like what was
going on at South Mountain, he started attacking the
commission and specifically, Mr. Overson.

Mr. Overson

defended himself.
In this Piper case, in the midst of the
campaign, one of the principals referred to the other one
as having circulated false and insidious rumors.
The Court said, Piper's statement about
(inaudible) answers to his own articles in the midst of a
heated campaign points up the fact that reply enjoys a
qualified privilege and is recognized as a defense to an
action for libel.
After an attack on a defendant by a plaintiff,
the defendant has the right to defend himself against
plaintiff's charges, even if he defames the plaintiff in
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doing so.
Okay.

THE COURT:

MR. GURMANKIN:

I—

And dismissed the

case.
THE COURT: What I'd like you to do
is to try and keep these to one issue at a time, as we go
through.

Those—
MR. GURMANKIN:

Oh.

—obviously relate to

THE COURT:
others.

MR. GURMANKIN:

All right.

THE COURT: And so that I can focus
jive-—
and then <
MR. GURMANKIN:
THE COURT:

I'm sorry.

—Mr. Snuffer a chance

to—to deal with your arguments on each one.
MR. GURMANKIN:
Honor.

I apologize, your

I—I think I've said it.
If there's a good faith belief in the truth,

then malice cannot be shown as a matter of law, but t h e —
the Gregory case I was going to get to said that, and I
think the record is clear, as I've made it in these
documents and nothing that he says is going t o —
THE COURT:

But—but I would suggest

that what Mr. Snuffer indicated was that your client knew
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1

that Mast and C.T.U. were not synonymous and his

2

discovery would provide evidence of that and so that then

3

becomes a factual question.

4

MR. GURMANKIN:

5

can we have a moment to talk about that, if that's the

6

issue?

7

Can we have a moment?

First of all, saying somebody is an alter ego

8

or is synonymous is not defamatory.

If Mr. Flynn—or

9

I'll take my—or if I say to Mr. Flynn, Mr. Flynn, you

10

know that little corporation you had set up?

11

ruse.

12

defamatory.

13

Yeah, it's just you, you're out there.

That's a
That's not

Not only that, if your Honor will look at

14

Exhibit 6, 7 and I don't have the number, but this is the

15

document request that was made, the GRAMA request,

16

Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, care of David K. Mast,

17

signed by David K. Mast.

18

The letter to the—to Brent Overson with an

19

attached article, accusing him of all kinds of nasty

20

things, sending copies to Horiuchi, Callahan and Doug

21

Short—

22

THE COURT: Yes, but I can see, Mr.

23

Gurmankin, that there are a nuiaber of things that you're

24

putting forth that would support your client's view that

25

they were the same; but whether they are or whether
55

they're not, or whether your client believed it or not
becomes a factual question, doesn't it?
MR. GURMANKIN:
if—if he had a good faith belief.

No—no, your Honor,
A good faith belief—

basis for believing it—assuming it was defamatory and I-I can't believe that's—
THE COURT:

But they haven't—they

haven't asked him that question yet, and aren't they
entitled to say, Did you have a good faith belief?
you know about these other things?

Did

Isn't that what the

purpose of the deposition is, is to see what those facts
are?
MR. GURMANKIN:

If the question were

whether those things were true, then I think that could
be explored; but when the question is whether a person
has a good faith basis for believing it and that's the
critical question, then the uncontroverted record here
shows that he does.
THE COURT:

But do we have anything

that says that he did believe it?
MR. GURMANKIN:

Well, we have the

fact that he said it and we have the fact that there was
a good faith basis for it, because everything that he
said was true.

As a matter of law, and I'll come back

again to their failure to controvert it; he didn't
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1
2

controvert one fact that he said, and he could have.
And—

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. GURMANKIN:

I'll—
And also the fact

5

that just calling that a ruse.

There's only one

6

statement here, your Honor, I believe that really raises

7

a question whether it's defamatory and that's the liar

8

question; How long do you have to put up with liars?

9

That's the only question that—that even gets close and

10

for a whole bunch of reasons, including the West Context

11

Doctrine, not being capable of defamatory meaning, I

12

think as a matter of law that's not; we don't get into

13

the root question here.

14

Because if I told my daughter today, hey,

15

daughter, you know, that little organization you set up

16

is just a front for you, even assuming I didn't have some

17

privilege as a parent, it's not defamatory.

18
19

I'll go on to the next one after Mr. Snuffer's
had a turn to respond.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SNUFFER:

22

25

So, which one am I to

respond to then?

THE COURT:

23
24

Mr. Snuffer?

It would be the absolute

executive officer.

MR. SNUFFER:
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This didn't happen in a

meeting of the county commission, this didn't happen—Mr.
Brent Overson could discharge his responsibilities as a
county commissioner without ever having done what he did.
Furthermore, I think it very clear that when he
turned around and published his publication, he wanted to
make it clear he was not acting as a county commissioner.
"This ad authorized and paid for by the Overson election
committee to clearly state the facts. This ad was not
paid for by taxpayer dollars."
He wasn't acting as a county commissioner.
was acting as Brent Overson personally.

He

I'm the only

commissioner facing re-election, I've been singled out by
David Mast, my character, I, I, my, I will not.

This is

Mr. Overson acting in his individual capacity.
If there were such a thing as an immunity based
upon something analogous to the speech and debate clause,
this wasn't speech and debate. The other county
commissioners and Brent Overson were not debating whether
or not to agree, vote, disapprove or not approve
something.

This was not Mr. Overson acting in his

official capacity.
And—and the allegations that he enjoys
immunity, if they are accurate at all, would require
something more than the fact that he holds an office at
the moment that he makes a statement.
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That would make

1

everyone who holds an office as executive in nature,

2

immune from whatever they say.

3

THE COURT:

But isn't this part of

4

participating in a public debate about the golf course?

5

I mean, the debate is more than just what goes on in

6

chambers, isn't it?

7

trying to lay out their view so that the public can get

8

involved and mobilized on one side or the other.

9
10

MR. SNUFFER:

Okay.

But when do you

go too far and when—when is the process itself—

11
12

I mean, part of it is each side

THE COURT:

That's what I was asking

Mr. Gurmankin, to help me draw that line.

13

MR. SNUFFER:

Right.

I think it

14

clear that Mr. Overson felt some personal need to engage

15

personally in the dialogue and not do it at taxpayer

16

expense because his ad makes it clear that he's not

17

spending taxpayer money.

18

If he's engaging in that dialogue, which he's

19

entitled to do and he wants to use his own voice and—and

20

not—if it—if it was him in his capacity as an

21

executive, why didn't this come out on county commission

22

letterhead?

23

commission?

24
25

Why wasn't it approved by the county

This was just him as an individual shooting his
mouth off.

And that's fine, too, if he confines it to
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1

the players in the—in the battle front.

2

reached out, for some personal reason, we believe when we

3

get into discovery, what we're going to find out is that

4

Mr. Overson was rather chummy with the South Mountain

5

people and they got him worked up.

6

THE COURT: Assuming even that's
true,—

9

MR. SNUFFER:

Well, it—then that's

10

why he wanted Mr. Mast viewed as the alter ego of

11

Concerned Taxpayers and as a liar.

12

that, to discredit him.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SNUFFER:

15

He

When this dialogue began—

7
8

He didn't.

That's why he wanted

Okay.

And—

The other point that I

want to make—

16

THE COURT:

17

back to the first argument, though; how—how does a

18

politician calling somebody a liar rise to the level of

19

defamatory?
MR. SNUFFER:

20
21
22

— I guess this relates

with immunity?

Politicians can do that

I think it's a question—
THE COURT:

No.

But I mean, again,

23

Justice Durham talks about the context.

24

a political discussion—

25

MR. SNUFFER:
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Okay.

In the course of

THE COURT:

— a politician, any

politician chooses to call somebody in their opposite
camp a liar,—
MR. SNUFFER:
THE COURT:

I—

—who's going to believe

that?
MR. SNUFFER:

I think that if Mr.

Overson wants to called the Concerned Taxpayers the liar,
that's okay; but you don't reach out to some individual
personally and attack him personally and gratuitously.
That's what he did here.
And when it comes to that, I think we're
entitled to confront him and cross-examine him and to
show that it was ill-motivated.
The other matter, and I need to clarify this
because I haven't mentioned it up to this point and it's
come up repeatedly in the statements of—of Mr.
Gurmankin.
The fact is that the—the reason that Judge
Medley dismissed the other lawsuit is because it was
moot.

The county did not buy that—that golf course.

The Concerned Taxpayers of Utah succeeded.

There were

seven plus million dollars of taxpayer money saved and as
a result of the fact that the county didn't purchase the
golf course, Judge Medley dismissed the case because it
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came moot, without any prejudice to the Concerned
Taxpayers' ability to step back in if there is something
at a later date, attempts to revive the purchase by the
county of the golf course.
golf course.

They didn't purchase that

It didn't happen. And—and statements

otherwise and suggestions otherwise, just aren't true.
I forget what the other matters were, I —
THE COURT:
that.

I—I distracted you from

The—
MR. SNUFFER:

I'm sorry.

THE COURT: —absolute executive
officer immunity.
So, are—are you willing to concede that if he
was functioning in his official capacity, he would be
protected?
MR. SNUFFER:

I think if he was

acting in his official capacity, then the defense would
lie and you would have to then examine carefully what it
was he said.

I don't think the defense—
THE COURT: Or what?

I mean, it's

either absolute or it isn't.
MR. SNUFFER:

Well, I don't—I don't

think the executive can say—well, if the county
commission is in the heat of a debate and getting to vote
on a motion and—and as they get a little enthusiastic
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about statements that are made, I think it would be tough
to hold them accountable in those circumstances, unless
completely gratuitous comments, unrelated to the
substance of the debate, intentionally harmful to
someone.
I mean, there again, what you're getting is,
even in that context, the possibility of the executive
officer stepping outside of his role and engaging in a
personal dialogue.

Clearly, that's what Mr. Overson did

here.
I don't—I think h e ~
THE COURT: But—but you're agreeing
with Mr. Gurmankin to the extent that if it was in his
capacity, there's an absolute immunity or is that an
inaccurate statement of the law?
MR. SNUFFER:

No, I—no.

I think

that goes too far on the law, too. What I'm arguing is,
assuming that his argument has some validity, then it
still falls under the facts of this case; but I'm not
sure that argument has any validity.
There isn't any Utah authority on that that I —
that I saw in the memorandum or (inaudible) stated from
other sources I—I took some question to.

I—I don't

know that it exists, but assuming it exists and I'm
conceding that for purposes of argument and I probably
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should not, but I concede that even beyond that, it
doesn't apply to the facts of this case.
And Mr. Overson himself made it very clear when
he placed a subsequent ad and said, this is not a
taxpayer ad, this is not taxpayer funded.

It's me. And

why would he do that if he were Mr.
Overson/slash/executive/slash/acting within the scope?
He wouldn't.

He didn't.

And I think that the argument on the facts fail
as a consequence.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SNUFFER:
THE COURT:
Mr. Gurmankin?

Thank you.

Thank you.

There is an absolute privilege

because it was consented to?
MR. GURMANKIN:

Yeah.

Can I just go

back to this previous argument and say one thing?
THE COURT:

You—you'll run out of

the time to get the other seven in; you've got 20 minutes
left.
MR. GURMANKIN:

I'll do it—I'll do

it quickly.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GURMANKIN:

Mr. Snuffer just

said, if he wants to call the Concerned Taxpayers a liar,
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1

that's okay, Concerned Taxpayers.

2

is what is he doing, is he acting in his capacity or is

3

he not.

4

The question here i s —

If he's acting in that capacity and it's okay

5

to call the Concerned Taxpayers a liar, then it's okay to

6

call anybody a liar.

7

Besides—and by the way, this ad, the facts, is

8

not defamatory, was paid for, was signed by a number of

9

people.

The reason they didn't use—they didn't have the

10

state, or the County pay for it was that they didn't want

11

to use taxpayer dollars.

12

to hold that he wasn't acting in his official capacity

13

when he had a press conference days before this to defend

14

himself.

15

Okay.

Consent.

I don't think that's a reason

Absolute privilege.

Cited a

16

couple of cases on it.

17

it.

18

vs. Seinbera dealt with a discharged plaintiff who

19

publicly challenged his former employer to prove the

20

truth of the charges leading to his dismissal.

21

employer did it and then he got sued for def—he sued the

22

employer for defamation.

23

Don't need to talk too long about

The Royer case, which we cited in our brief, Royer

He asked for it.

So did Mr. Mast.

The

Mr. Mast,

24

if you'll read the documents in the record that preceded

25

the press conference, kept writing letters, asking for
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1

documents, wanted the grand jury, he asked them for a

2

response.

3
4

And my position is that as a matter of law, it
was an invited response and so even though—
THE COURT: An implied asking or is

5
6

there a specific, explicit asking for a response?
MR. GURMANKIN:

7

8

May I have a minute

with—
THE COURT: Sure.

9

MR. GURMANKIN:

10

In the February 26th,

11

1996, letter, and this is just one example, Mast signs a

12

letter, it's on C.T.U. letterhead, "We would like to know

13

what the county's intent is for South Mountain and its

14

golf course property.

15

16
17
18

I with them privately or in the open?

21

the work back to South Mountain for what they did,
absorbing the price at the expense of the Utah taxpayer."
And I would say that the exhibits which contain
the—the statements by Mr. Mast are replete with
invitations to respond.
Here we go.

22
23
24
25

Does the county

intend for the public to competitively bid or just give

19
20

Does the county intend on dealing

Exhibit 8, a 1995 Deseret News

article.
THE COURT:

8 is October 28th of '96?

MR. GURMANKIN:
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No—-yeah.

October

-I

28th, 1996.

I'm sorry.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

So, this is after

3 I the press conference?
4

MR. GURMANKIN:

5

example of what h e — t h e — t h e way—the things that Mast

6

asked for.

7

now and et cetera.

g

the first page and goes on to the second, he continues to

a

rely on the legal system, because it is the only way to

doors, fires a volley of other accusations at Overson,

13

including the claim that the county isn't buying the

14

15

land.

16

jury.

20
21
22
23
24
25

He continued—and at the bottom of

Overson of violating State law by meeting behind closed

12

19

He was talking about how he's a law student

In the August 22nd, 1996, ad, he accuses

11

18

But it's an

know the whole story.

10

17

Yeah.

I

Asked the Attorney General to convene a grand

And I'll—I'll just go with it this way, your
Honor.

I'll say it's an implied consent, and that as a

matter of law and this record, he consented to Mr.
Overson asking these questions and that consent means
that even if there—under the Royer case, even if there
were a defamatory statement—and you will excuse me if I
sit down, your Honor?
THE COURT:

That's fine.

MR. GURMANKIN:
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That it is, as a

1

matter of law, there is no claim,

2

By the way, on March 4th, 1996—I knew I'd find

3

it—Mast sent a letter to each county commissioner and

4

the County Attorney calling upon Overson to schedule a

5

public meeting and have public comment on the issue

6

stating, That way at least, it will not appear as though

7

you have something to hide*

g
9

I take that as an indication—and—and Overson
let it simmer, then comes the—
THE COURT: However, an official

10
11
12

13

public meeting is certainly different than a press
I conference.

When they—they both lay things out in

public but one has the forum of a public meeting at

.|4 least.
MR. GURMANKIN:

15

Uh huh.

I--I

16

| understand what your Honor is saying, what—but the point

17

I here is, if there is an invitation and then something is

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

done defamatory, I assume at the public meeting, you
wouldn't have said it was defamatory, then it's been
invited.

In any event, that's—that's the position on

that point.
THE COURT:
MR. SNUFFER:

Okay.
Yes.

Mr. Snuffer?
On that point,

the case that he cites, the Royer case that he focused on
in the memorandum says, the plaintiff publicly challenged
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-I

his former employer to, quote, "prove the truth of the

2

charges leading to his dismissal."

3

this challenge, quote, "constituted nothing less than a

4

request for the publication of the evidence upon which

5

the employer based the charges", unquote.
I mean, that's not what happened here and the

6
7

facts of Royer uniquely limit its applicability.
The March 4th, '96 letter for a public hearing

8
9

The Court held that

is far different than what happened at the press

10

conference that Mr. Overson held, in which

^

representatives of the Concerned Taxpayers, including Mr.

12

Christiansen, who's here, and got up and asked if he

13

could ask a question of Mr. Overson on behalf of the

14

Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, but Mr. Overson said, no,

15
16
17

you can't, this is my press conference, this is for the
press only, I'm not going to answer you people's
I questions.
And that's not the kind of public hearing that

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

the March 4th, '96 letter was inviting at which it would
have a formal get-together of a quorum of the county
commission and evidence presented on both sides of the
issue.
That's vastly different than the press
conference that we're talking about here.

We don't have

a consent t o — a challenge for, and a request for
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-I

publication of evidence; and furthermore, even if the

2

challenge was made within the—the context of everything

3

that they urged on the Court, it was made by the entity

4

and not by the individual and a single act gratuitously

5

affecting individual is a different matter and involves

6

different principles,

7

You can't say that Jones invited me to—to tell

8

the truth, so now I'm going to attack Smith.

g

the way the challenge would work, if you were to find in

10
11
12

That's not

this case—which is really a stretch—that there was such
a challenge.
The—the cite to the Royer case itself

13 distinguishes it factually from the facts of this case,
14 I your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Gurmankin, the fourth

15
16
17

area is that the statements were opinion and protected by
the Utah Constitution.
MR. GURMANKIN:

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I'll—I'll rest on

what we've written.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GURMANKIN:

I think your Honor

has expressed that your Honor understands it.

The West

case, I think clearly, in the context again, they're
saying there was four standards on whether it's an
opinion and I think they're met in this case.
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So, I'll

submit that without—I won't—I will submit it, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
Mr. Snuffer?
MR. SNUFFER:

Well, again, I—I think

that if you consider the record that's before you—I'm
going to get some scotch tape, here's a little notice to
the attorneys up here, it's torn and (inaudible)—I think
that if—if you look at the record that is before you,
your Honor, that it's clear that what—what Mr. Overson
did on that day is to go off half-cocked, attacking an
individual when if—if he wanted to engage in the kind of
dialogue that he says he was attempting to engage in, he
had no reason to—he wanted to change the dialogue, he
wanted to come to that meeting on that day and alter the
focus, he wanted to get into personalities and he wanted
to attack Mr. Mast individually and he wanted to do that
because of private meetings he'd had with the competing
developers. ~ That's what he wanted to do.
Take it out of the context of the Concerned
Taxpayers of Utah and turn it into a personality contest
and involve Mr. Mast and to say that he was a liar and to
attack him and he did that.
And what we're saying now is, given those facts
which are of record in the—in the documents that are
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1

before you, without the benefit of an answer having been

2

filed, with no discovery having been cooperated in by the

3

defendant up to this moment, should this case be

4

dismissed on the merits of summary judgment, or should we

5

take one step back, as I was talking to you earlier,

6

we're—we're about out of the time that you had

7

scheduled, and close the pleadings, allow for some

a

discovery and fix these issues before you, because there

q

are questions of moment raised in the materials that are

10

before the Court.
And it seems singularly hasty, unwise and

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18

imprudent to—to take this case at this moment and treat
where we are as either a motion to dismiss or a summary
judgment motion without affording the plaintiff, who's
been called a liar in front of newspapers, television,
radio announcers, who have in turn repeated that
publication throughout this community, without giving him
an opportunity to engage in any discovery whatsoever.
I think that would be imprudent and unwise and

19
20
21
22

that is after all, the moment we are at here today and
that—that ought to be the—the question we return to
again.
I'm happy to answer any questions the Court

23
24
25

has, but I—I do think the matter's been adequately
briefed.
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1

THE COURT:

Okay.

2

MR. SNUFFER:

3

THE COURT:

Thank you.
Thank you.

Mr. Gurmankin, finally, the qualified privilege

4

of self defense.
6

I

MR. GURMANKIN:

Last point and I want

7

to just lump the self defense and the protecting

o

legitimate interest of the defendant together—
THE COURT:

g

MR. GURMANKIN:

10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17

from some cases.

20
21

22
23
24
25

— a n d just read you

Right on point, Piper vs. Beaur it's

Tab 26 in—in our book, we have volumes for you.

An

attack answering accusations against the county
treasurer, the Court says, Piper's statements in the
midst of a heated campaign points out the fact that reply
enjoys a qualified privilege and is recognized as a
defense to an action for libel.
After an attack on a defendant by a plaintiff,

18
19

Okay.

defendant has the right to defend himself against
plaintiff's charges, even if he defames the plaintiff in
doing so,
Gregory vs. Porn County. this is No. 20 in your
book, your Honor.

A teacher sued a school superintendent

for defaming her and said that what he said was a lie.
The Court said the claim will be denied.
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Togerson's

-I

article, that was the plaintiff's article, infringed

2

legally cognizable interest of Yeager—I substitute

3

Overson for Yeager—which he had a qualified privilege

4

under law to protect.
He also enjoyed a personal privilege of self

5
6

defense.

His statements at the meeting of teacher

7

representatives and in his letter were reasonably limited

o

to defense of his interest, rather this is a matter of

g

law, and the person to whom the statements were addressed
had sufficient legitimate interest in their contents to

10

preclude the defendant's waiver of the privilege to

11

excessive publication.

12

THE COURT:

13

Okay.

If it's a personal

14

privilege of self defense, doesn't that take it outside

15

of the official scope then?

16

I

MR. GURMANKIN:
alternative grounds, your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. GURMANKIN:

20

I just wanted to

Okay.

Absolutely,

yes.

21
I

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. GURMANKIN:

23

25

Okay.

make sure that I'm clear, so it's one or the other then.

19

24

I—they're

malice.

No waiver through

Since Yeager was clearly acting in good faith to

protect his interests and the Fran, it's the Yellow Cab,
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-I

People's Cab case from the Federal Court in Pittsburgh,

2

where the Court said all those statements wherein

3

Armstrong either denies the accusations from the previous

4

night's news or where he gives his impressions of Fran's

5

previous statements—by the way, he basically called Fran

6

a liar—are not capable of defamatory meaning.

7

Plaintiff, Fran, had seriously accused Yellow

o

Cab of much wrongdoing on a previous show, Armstrong was

g

entitled to express his impression of Fran's statements.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Your Honor, I'll say this man and, you know,
they can talk all they want about whether the C.T.U. is
one party and Mast is another party, I invite you to look
at the record and see whether anybody ever spoke for
C.T.U. but Mast and what the press thought of whether
Mast was separate from the C.T.U.
He called my guy a felon and the law is for a —
I the Court uses all—the Courts use these rules, if you
start a fight in the newspaper, if you start a public
fight and you call somebody a nasty name, you can't call
anybody anything much nastier than going and trying—than
publicly announcing—publicly announcing in your name
that you've asked for a criminal investigation.
Don't come crying to the Court if somebody says
that—that you lied or attacks you back.

That's the

doctrine, that's what I submit and there is not a
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1

question, not only has Mr. Snuffer failed in—in meeting

2

the rules and there's a reason for those rules and we've

3

been dealing with that today, there—there is not a

4

question but that on this record, not only was it not

5

defamatory, but all he was doing was protecting himself.

g

He focused on—he didn't focus on Mast's

7

personal life or anything, he was dealing with South

8

Mountain and he responded.

g

acts like a big man, says he's the lawsuit man, says I

So Mast starts a big fight,

have plenty of money, attacks my client in the press,

10
^

attacks him by going to the County Attorney and trying to
get a criminal charge against him and now he comes crying

12

to you and the law doesn't provide a remedy, as a matter

13

of law.

14
15

I

Thank you.

16

,

THE COURT: Mr. Snuffer?

17

I

MR. SNUFFER:

18

. confuses two separate entities, two separate individuals

1Q

and it attempts to gloss over that distinction which is

20

I substantive and which is real.

21

I

Again, that argument

Returning to their memorandum on this very

2p

point and I'm reading from his memorandum, Mast must show

23

that Overson published the words with, quote, "an

24

improper motive such as a desire to do harm or that he

25

did not honestly believe the statements to be true."
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That's what the memorandum says and I don't dispute that.
The Mast affidavit-

I'll need to take the

deposition of Mr. Overson in order to oppose his
allegations that the statements he made were in self
defense without the transcript, video or audio tapes. I
can't take the deposition of Mr. Overson and fully oppose
the claim he makes that the statements were made in self
defense.
The statements were not self defense but rather
than attack on me intended to disparage and defame me and
my reputation.
of 56(f).
motive?

This clearly is squarely within the scope

It's fact sensitive.

What was Overson's

What was Overson's belief?

How do we weigh and

test that without subjecting him to a deposition in which
I get an opportunity to ask him about that motive, to ask
him about that belief and to confront him with the
history that will make it difficult, if not impossible,
for him to maintain that he had a proper motive and that
he had an honest belief.
He dealt with the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah
and solicited them to participate in other litigation.
If he denies that, we have Mr. Dryer, his attorney in
that other matter, who can corroborate that he knew about
that.
In any event, the argument is flawed because it
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attempts to homogenize an individual with an entity.
Assuming everything that Mr. Gurmankin says is true, it
goes only to comments and a license to make comments as
to the entity, Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, and it
doesn't give him a license to say what he will about Mr.
Mast, individually, as he did in the press conference.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

Mr. Gurmankin, I asked

Mr. Snuffer at the beginning and I ought to give you a
chance to talk about that as well, whether it's
appropriate to translate these into a motion to dismiss
if 56(f) has been met.
MR. GURMANKIN:
Honor.

I'm sorry, your

I'm not sure I understand the—the question.

If

56(f) has been met?
THE COURT:

If the motion for summary

judgment, if they're entitled to d o —
MR. GURMANKIN:
THE COURT:

Oh.

—discovery before I rule

on the motions for summary judgment, some of these
arguments, at least to me, appear to be that whatever
facts they discover, the question is whether they would
be able to meet your motions.
Should I consider those as motions to dismiss
within summary judgment motions?
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j

MR. GURMANKIN:

Your Honor, I'm—I'm

2

hesitant to convert them because I wanted to make a

3

record, I think for some of those, for you to hold that

4

as a matter of law, you need to consider the record

5

that's been made and therefore, you wouldn't just be

g

looking at the four corners of their complaint.
So—

8

I

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GURMANKIN:

9

—what I will do is

add an alternative 12(b)(6) motion, but I'll leave on

10

file the—the Rule 56 motion and my other positions.

11
12

I

THE COURT: Okay.

13

,

MR. GURMANKIN:

14

I answered your question.

Is that~I hope I've

15

THE COURT: Okay.

16

MR. GURMANKIN:

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Thank you, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

going to take it under advisement.
MR. SNUFFER:
THE COURT:

And gentlemen, I'm

I—

Do you have—

—sometimes falsely

suggest to counsel I'll have something quickly; this one
is going to take—take some reading and some work, but I
will try and be as timely as I can.
MR. SNUFFER:
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Your Honor, in the

-j

meantime, do you want to order the parties to cooperate

2

in discovery or are we going t o — I mean# if I do anything

3

else, I'm going to get a motion for a protective order,

4

we're not going to get discovery.
THE COURT:

5

I'm not going to order

anybody to do anything until I get this resolved.

6

MR. SNUFFER:

7

THE COURT:

Okay.
I mean, if you want to

a I file motions to compel and those kinds of things,
10

certainly you can do that and preserve your positions,

11

but I#m not going to rule on'those things until I resolve

12

this.
I think there are enough questions in this that

13
14

I need to take a — a hard serious look at this.

15

not something that I have already decided and will take a

16

matter of dashing something out.

17

I give this some consideration.

18

I

THE COURT:

20

I

21

I flonor.

22

23
24
25

I'm going to have to

MR. SNUFFER:

1Q

Okay.
Okay.

MR. GURMANKIN:

THE COURT:

This is

Thank you, your

Thank you.

MR. GURMANKIN:

I also want to thank

you for allowing my daughter t o —
THE COURT:
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Okay.

I'm just—I'm

•j

amazed at how patient she is to sit for two hours of oral

2

argument and be sane s t i l l .

g

MR. GURMANKIN:

4

I guess she gets a

lot of practice at home.

_

THE COURT:

She's always welcome to

g I come back.
_

MR. GURMANKIN:

8

i Honor.

g

I

1Q

....

MR. SNUFFER:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Thank you.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

12
13

Thank you, your
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14
15
16
17
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19
20
21
22
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transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 29th
September, 1997.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

DAVID K. MAST,

CASE NO.960907782

Plaintiff,
vs.
BRENT OVERSON,
Defendant.

Plaintiff, David K. Mast, through counsel, filed his complaint
on November 6, 1996. Defendant, Brent Overson, responded and filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 27, 1997. Oral argument
was held before the Court on June 9, 1997.

The issue before the

court is whether statements made by the defendant in two newspaper
articles and a full-page advertisement are defamatory to the
plaintiff.
FACTUAL SETTING
This case arises out of Salt Lake County's proposed purchase
of South Mountain Golf Course.

The plaintiff, David Mast, who is

a real estate developer and the president of "Concerned Taxpayers
of Utah," opposed this acquisition.

A heated debate ensued with

the plaintiff sending several letters to the Salt Lake County
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C o m m i s s i o n e r s , and w i t h t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s

objections to the purchase

b e i n g quoted in s e v e r a l l o c a l newspaper a r t i c l e s .

This

criticism

c u l m i n a t e d w i t h t h e Concerned T a x p a y e r s of Utah p l a c i n g a

full-page

advertisement

in

a

local

newspaper,

entitled,

"S.L.

COUNTY

COMMISSIONER, BRENT OVERSON MISLEADS THE PUBLIC AND CONTINUES TO
VIOLATE STATE LAW!"

The d e f e n d a n t ' s r e a c t i o n s t o t h e

advertisement

were r e p o r t e d and quoted i n two s e p a r a t e l o c a l newspaper
Closely following these a r t i c l e s ,
by

the

defendant's

defendant

re-election

and o t h e r s ,

a full-page
committee

was p u b l i s h e d

in

articles.

advertisement,

and

co-signed

a local

paid

by

the

newspaper.

s t a t e m e n t s a l l e g e d t o be d e f a m a t o r y t o t h e p l a i n t i f f

are

The

contained

within these three publications.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment
issues

of

material

is

appropriate

fact

and

j u d g m e n t a s a m a t t e r of l a w ,

the

when t h e r e

moving

party

Utah R.Civ.P.

are
is

no

genuine

entitled

to

56(c).

DEFAMATION

The U t a h Supreme C o u r t ,

i n Cox v . H a t c h ,

761 P . 2 d 556

(Utah

1988), recognized that a defamation a c t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y begins
a threshold
Stating,

finding t h a t the statement has a defamatory

"[w]hether

statement...is

the

capable

publication
of

conveying

of
a

an

alleged

defamatory

i n i t i a l l y a q u e s t i o n of l a w , " t h e c o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t ,

with

meaning.

defamatory
message
"[o]nly

is
if
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a court first determines that a publication might be considered
defamatory by a reasonable person is there a fact issue for the
trier of fact." Id. at 561. Thus, this Court must first evaluate
the statements at issue for a defamatory message.
"Under Utah law, a statement is defamatory if it impeaches an
individual's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation and thereby
exposes the individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule."
West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994) .

In

defining a defamatory statement, the Utah Supreme Court explained
that, "the guiding principle is one statement's tendency to injure
a reputation in the eyes of its audience." IdEvaluating the effect of the statements upon the reputation of
the plaintiff requires a contextual viewing of the statements.1 The
plaintiff, as early as April 16, 1996, began publicly criticizing
Salt Lake County's interest in purchasing the South Mountain Golf
Course.

The plaintiff's criticisms were reported in at least four

newspaper

articles prior to

advertisement.

the August

22, 1996,

full-page

Then, on August 22, 1996, Concerned Taxpayers of

Utah, of which the plaintiff is the president, placed a full-page
newspaper advertisement targeting the defendant, again criticizing

lTI

A court simply cannot determine whether a statement is
capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning by viewing individual
words in isolation; rather it must carefully examine the context in
which the statement was made, giving the words their most common
and accepted meaning." West, 872 P.2d at 1008.
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the County regarding the proposed purchase of South Mountain Golf
Course.

The alleged defamatory statements were published in

response to this full-page advertisement.
Though this Court recognizes that the two articles and the
full-page advertisement co-signed by the defendant criticize the
plaintiff, this Court does not believe that these statements would
injure the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of the audience.

The

statements of both parties revolved around Salt Lake County's
purchase of South Mountain Golf Course.
defendant

were

reported

in the

criticisms by the plaintiff.

The statements by the

same medium

as

the

initial

The statements found in the two

newspaper articles were in direct response to the plaintiff's fullpage

advertisement.

An audience would easily recognize the

responsive nature and tone of the statements. Furthermore, readers
are likely to consider the political arena of the statements, and
the accompanying editorial nature.
Debate occurring in the political arena is understood to be
peculiar.

Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney

v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-376 (1927), declared:
Those who won our independence believed . . . that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be
a fundamental principle of the American government. They
recognized the risks to which all human institutions are
subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction;
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
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imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and
that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Believeing in the power of reason as applied through
public discussion, they eschwed silence coerced by law—
the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they
amended the Constitution so that free speech and asembly
should be guaranteed.
The Supreme Court endorsed this viewpoint in
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957):

Roth v. United

"[t]he protection given speech

and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people."
254,

270

Likewise, in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.

(1964),

the "profound national commitment

to the

principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open" was noted.

And lastly, the Supreme Court

has stated, "[w]hatever differences may exist about interpretations
of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement
that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 218 (1966).
Newspaper readers recognize that the political arena is a
fertile source of "pointed, harsh, and even defamatory criticism."
West, 872 P.2d at 1020.

The statements of the defendant were a

piece of a puzzle framed by politics, public spending, and an
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upcoming election. Readers would have known and understood this,
and weighed the statements accordingly.

Thus, even though the

criticism may have been harsh or even false, "it cannot be said
that it exposed [the plaintiff] to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule." Id. at 1011.
Furthermore, those who voluntarily enter the political arena
have been warned by the Utah Supreme Court that they should,
"expect to be jostled and bumped in a way that a private person
need not expect... [T]hose who place themselves in a political arena
must accept a degree of derogation that others need not." West,
872 P.2d at 1019-20.
Adding this caution to the dedication of the Supreme Court to
protect

the purpose of the First Amendment, and adding the

audience's recognition of the nature of the political arena, it is
clear that the statements made by the defendant would not have
injured the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of the audience. As
a matter of law, the defendant's statements are not defamatory.2

2

Because the statements cannot meet the requisite threshold
determination of defamatory meaning, this court will not address
the defenses raised by the defendant. As well, the Rule 56(f)
motion does not require comment as the discovery is not required as
the statement is not defamatory as a matter of law.
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CONCLUSION
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
Dated this'

day of August, 1997:

WILLI
DISTRIC
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following,
this Y/^—day of August, 1997:
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff
10885 S. State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Jay D. Gurmankin
Attorney for Defendant
50 S. Main, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

